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INTRODUCTION
The "academic achievement gap between Black and Latino students
and their White counterparts may well be the most important problem in
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education today.1 As measured by the National Assessment of Educational
Progress ("NEAP") standardized reading scores of 17 year olds, educa-
tional disparities continually narrowed from the 1970's to the 1980's.2
However, in the late 1980's, the steady and sharp increases in the standard-
ized test scores of Black students leveled off and began fluctuating for
Hispanic students.3 Recent news reports indicate that scores on the math
and verbal components of the SAT, the test most colleges and universities
use in admission procedures, have risen for over a decade.4 Yet there re-
mains as much as a 100 point gap between the average scores of Black
and Hispanic students and those of White and Asian American students.5
Even as the scores increased overall, the gap widened.6 Students from low-
income families scored lower than their wealthier counterparts as well.
The fact that many minority students taking the exam cannot afford the
costly SAT prep courses that wealthier students take exacerbates the prob-
lem. The intersecting problems of class and race compound to present a
daunting challenge to many who view access to quality education as the
great social equalizer.8
Teachers, parents, policymakers, and experts in learning and the law
continue to debate solutions by looking at the problem from the perspec-
tive of their own fields. Most measures addressing the issue fail to consider
the role that our collective consciousness about race plays in creating the
problem and can play in the formulation of solutions. Professor Charles
Lawrence argues that our unwillingness to have a candid discussion about
race and racism continues to undermine the goals of Brown v. Board of
1. ROBERT E. SLAVIN & NANCY A. MADDEN, "Success for All" and African American
and Latino Student Achievement in BRIDGING THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 74 (John E. Chubb &
Tom Loveless, eds., 2002).
2. Institute of Education Sciences, Indicator 13: Reading Proficiency, at http://
nces.ed.gov/programs/youthindicators/Indicators.asp?PubPageNumber=13 (last visited
November 7, 2006).
3. For example in 1970, the average National Assessment of Educational Progress
score for Black students was 170. Rising steadily throughout the decade, by 1980, the
average score for that group peaked at 190. In 1984, the average score was closer to 185. In
1989, the average score dropped to around 182, but rose to 185 in 1994 and about 191 in
1996 before dropping to around 186 in 1999. See SLAvIN & MADDEN, supra note 1, at 75.
According to the Commissioner for the National Center for Education Statistics the aver-
age score for Blacks students in 2000 and 2005 reflected no substantial change from the
1996 average score. Institute of Education Sciences, Commissioner's Remarks-National As-
sessment of Educational Progress NEAP 2005 Science Results, at http://nces.ed.gov/
whatsnew/conmi-ssioner/remarks2006/5242006.asp (May 24, 2006).
4. See Robert Strauss, The SAT Results Within the Results, N.Y TIMEs, Sept. 4, 2005,
at 3.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND EDU-
CATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 2 (2004).
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Education.9 Our inability to address the issues of race and racism in today's
discussion of education can, in part, be attributed to the discourse that
was developed in nineteenth century race cases and continues in modern
equal education decisions. It is a discourse that ignored the community
harm done by inadequate education dictated by racism.
This Article combines analysis of case law at state and federal levels
as well as federal educational policy in an effort to formulate a framework
for addressing educational inequalities, of which the achievement gap is
only one result. As individual rights concepts control the discourse of
equal educational opportunity, community injury continues to be ig-
nored. Because educational policy aimed at ending educational inequities
is governed by equal protection analysis and guided by court decisions,
limitations in legal opinions drive such policies. The lack of attention to
community harm in law and educational policy limits the ability of edu-
cation legal reforms and education policy initiatives to address the scope
of the problem of educational inequalities. This essay contextualizes the
issue to demonstrate how policies have reinforced a dominant narrative
about race that is counter to the goal of ending educational disparities
and continues to harm individuals and communities of color even as they
try to respond to these issues.
Part I of the article examines the legal framework of the Brown v.
Board of Education Court and traces it back to the 1899 decision of Cum-
ming v. Richmond Board of Education.10 The plaintiffs in Cumming challenged
the Richmond School Board's decision to close Ware High School, the
only public high school open to Blacks, while maintaining a public high
school for White students. In upholding the constitutionality of the
Board's decision, the Cumming Court embraced a paradigm that con-
trolled even after the decision in Brown.
The facts surrounding the establishment and the closing of Ware
High School demonstrate the almost intractable inter-relationship be-
tween politics, economics, race education and community. Yet, in an
opinion written by Justice John Harlan, the decision in Cumming ignores
the relationships and the impact of the Board's decision on the Black
community in Augusta, Georgia. Part I of this Article discusses how the
Board's decision drained economic, social and political capital embodied
in the Ware High School. It argues that that this injury was ignored and
even reinforced by Brown and in subsequent decisions. It demonstrates how
this decontextualized view of the dynamics of the education system and its
role in reflecting and promoting social, political and economic equality
continues to govern today.Today, what some analysts call the "jurisprudence
9. Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and Commu-
nity (A Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 YALE LJ. 1353
(2005); see also Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
FALL 20061
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of choice"'" and what others characterize as the "privatization of con-
,12
cern for education dominate public and legal discourse, but, like the
choice offered by the Richmond School Board, choice today rarely in-
corporates the option of educating all students beyond a basic education.
Part II of this Article outlines the major policy initiatives and litiga-
tion efforts aimed at closing the gap between the quality of education
poor Black and Hispanic (Brown) students often receive and the educa-
tion that White students receive. It examines these fractured policies and
litigation strategies and demonstrates their relationship to constitutional
jurisprudence. It argues for a new model for ending disparities that incor-
porates attention to social, political and economic empowerment of
communities of color and the poor as a way to address the marginaliza-
tion they experience.
Part III explores the situation in the Ladera Heights neighborhood
of Inglewood, California as a modern day example of the breakdown in
the resources available to parents and communities in educating their
children. In Ladera Heights, Black upper and middle class parents are at-
tempting to secede from the predominantly Black Inglewood School
District into which they currently are drawn.The parents want to relocate
to a more affluent and largely White neighboring school district with a
reputation for better scholastic outcomes and fewer behavioral problems
than Inglewood Schools. Part III illustrates how Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence and the policies it fostered have worked to the disadvantage
of educational achievement in the Inglewood District and injured the
entire Ladera Heights community.
I.THE ORIGINS OF A RIGHT: FEDERAL LAW AS A
REFLECTION OF CULTURAL NARRATIVE
Pivotal to the analysis of the achievement gap problem is an under-
standing of the legal decisions that have addressed the issue of educational
disparities. The Supreme Court decisions guiding educational equality
began with Brown v. Board of Education,1 3 and continued through San Anto-
nio v. Rodriguez14 and Grutter v. Bollinger.'" These cases, along with state
adequacy litigation and federal educational policy, have had significant
influence on efforts to close achievement gaps. Importantly, they also fol-
low a common theme about race and achievement that conflicts with
ideas about achievement inequality coming from minority communities.
11. See Nancy Levit, Embracing Segregation: The Jurisprudence of Choice and Diversity in
Race and Sex Separatism in Schools, U. ILL. L. REV. 455, 492 (2005).
12. See Lawrence III, supra note 9, at 1396.
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
15. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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This theme and the narrative surrounding, which comes from the courts
and policy makers, reduces the effectiveness of those in Latino and Black
communities in seeking a solution to educational achievement problems.
Thus, the theme and narratives have hampered efforts to end disparities.
But even before Brown, Cumming v. Richmond Board of Education set the
stage for the narrative theme of education desegregation and educational
equity.
In many ways, much of law is about narratives. Competing narra-
tives or stories are often what bring parties to trial. New narratives or
even variations on the stories that brought the parties to trial can develop
from court decisions. This is especially true in areas of the law where
rights are intertwined with custom, culture, society and race. In his semi-
nal work on law and narrative written in 1982, law professor Robert
Cover described the storytelling role law plays. 6 Cover argued that soci-
ety is made up of numerous communities, each guided by rules and
standards that are located in and defined by community experiences.17 In
our society these communities are often defined by race, class and even
language commonalities. However a community is defined, out of their
shared experiences comes a vision of reality that is expressed in the com-
munity narrative.
Narratives can be further divided into "Master Narratives" and
"Counter Narratives." Master Narratives are not often recognized as nar-
ratives-instead, a Master Narrative is the internalized norms of a larger
community as expressed in law and mores. Counter Narratives are the
narratives of marginalized groups, like Blacks and women, which create
"different perspectives" generally unavailable to "groups outside that par-
ticular [realm of] experience and reality."8
A. Segregation, Labor and Public Schools
In 1899, the Supreme Court adopted a position that accepted the
segregation of Black and White students in the post war South.19 In
addition to the segregation that was a part of the culture of the Southern
United States and that led to the Brown decision, various forms of defacto
school segregation were practiced throughout the Southwestern states. In
both areas, the segregation was based on race/ethnicity and related to the
dominant agrarian economies of the regions. Southwestern segregation of
Latinos was most entrenched in California and Texas. Historian
16. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HAuv. L. REv. 4 (1983).
17. Id.
18. D. SoYINi MADisoN, That Was My Occupation: Oral Narratives, Performance, and
Black Feminist Thought in EXCEPTIONAL SPACES: EssAYs IN PERFORMANCE AND HisTORy 319,
338 (Della Pollock ed., 1998).
19. See Cumming, 175 U.S. at 544-45.
FALL 2006]
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Christopher Arriola has chronicled the social separation of Anglos and
Mexicans in El Modena, California, the setting for one of the leading
cases on segregation:
It was more common than not during the 1920s for southern
California towns to be segregated. Segregation in the citrus so-
ciety encompassed many harsh and unjust realities, from
segregated housing and public places, to inferior social status
and political and economic exploitation. Mexicans and Anglos
lived in truly separate worlds. 0
Other historians have made similar observations. According to social his-
torian Charles Wollenberg, "[s] egregation was the rule wherever Mexicans
reside in sizable colonies,' and it was a reality, 'from cradle to grave' visible
in all aspects of daily life."'
As with Blacks in the South, employment and labor expectations
dictated educational opportunities for Mexican Americans in the South-
west. Language differences were also used as a basis for reducing
educational opportunities to Mexican American children.
The pervasive nature of the role segregation played in the lives of
Mexican Americans may have been lost on the courts. The first effort to
end segregation in the court system was taken in Alvarez v. Owen.2  The
California state court concluded that the plaintiffs, Mexican American
children, were White under the law and therefore the state did not have a
legal basis for segregating them, unlike Black or Native American chil-
dren. In deeming the children legally White, the court ignored the many
ways in which Mexican Americans experienced discrimination through-
out the society. Yet the parents of the children in the Lemon Grove
School system (which was the subject of the suit) understood the link
between their employment and the educational system. Lemon Grove was
not only the name of the school and town in which the plaintiffs sued--it
also reflected the agrarian economy that dominated the region. Many of
the Mexican Americans in the region were employed in the citrus indus-
try. School systems argued that the transient nature of the work of
Mexican American school children's parents was a second pedagogical
basis for the segregation of the children. Therefore, separate educational
facilities could take into account seasonal patterns of attendance.23
20. Christopher Arriola, Knocking on the Schoolhouse Door: Mendez v. Westminster,
Equal Protection, Public Education, and Mexican Americans in the 1940s, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 166,
171 (1995).
21. CHARLES WOLLENBERG, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: SEGREGATION AND EXCLUSION IN
CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS 1855-1975 113 (1976).
22. No. 66-625 (San Diego County Super. Ct., Apr. 17, 1931).
23. See Frederick P. Aguirre, School District: How it Affected Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 47 ORANGE CouNTY LAWYER 30, 35 (2005).
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The next significant litigation to end segregation of Mexican
Americans in California began a decade after Alvarez. The effort to inte-
grate the schools in the Orange County school district of Westminster
began when a group of Mexican American and Latinos convinced the
school board to propose a bond issue for a new integrated school. 4 The
bond issue failed, but the effort did not.2' The individuals behind the
bond issue pursued the desegregation effort in federal court. The ensuing
litigation resulted in Westminster v. Mendez, in which the federal Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the segregation of children of
"Mexican and Latin descent" was a violation of the 14th Amendment of
the Constitution. The litigation was a precursor for the decision in Brown
v. Board of Education.26
Historian Leon F Litwack has described the role that segregation
and economics played in the education of Blacks in the post Civil War
South . The pervasive policy of oppression and subjugation of Blacks in
the South was evident in the dilapidated facilities and inadequate learning
tools available to Black students. Since local public officials had little in-
terest in formally educating Blacks, many Black communities had to find
their own buildings for teaching their children. Many were schooled in
what Litwack describes as "makeshift, primitive, unpainted one-room
board structures with shaky floors and cracks in the walls and roof and the
pot-bellied wooden stove in the center of the room.
' 28
There was no set school term. Instead it "varied with labor demands,
the growing schedule of cotton, and the weather. If the children were suf-
ficiently grown (eight years old), they did not come to class until after the
cotton had been picked, often in November, sometimes as late as January,
and they would have to leave school in the early. spring to prepare fields
for the new crop. In the experience of most rural youths, the school year
consisted of two to five months, compressed between harvest and spring
planting time... Attendance, then, varied sharply, usually defying predic-
tion. No sooner had some students settled down to schoolwork than a
parent or employer would appear at the door and order them to the
fields.... Labor demands simply translated into irregular attendance-or no
attendance at all-and it was the reason cited by most black youths who
failed to obtain any kind of education. The average student dropped out of
school in the fifth or sixth grade, having acquired the bare rudiments. 29
24. See WOLLENERG, supra note 21, at 125.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 131-32.
27. See LEON E LITWACK,TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM
CROW (Alfred A. Knopf ed., Random House, 1998).
28. Id. at 64. (For example, my siblings were educated in the local church building
from grades 1 through 6. My parents and their teachers and were expected to provide
teaching materials including pencils, paper and textbooks.)
29. Id. at 64-65.
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Black parents began to see education as a way to provide their children
with protection from economic exploitation as well as a way to improve
their prospects for better employment.
This effort was evident in Augusta, Georgia where, in 1880, Black
parents successfully petitioned the county school authorities to establish a
30high school for Black children. In 1897, Joseph W Cumming and two
other Black plaintiffs challenged the Richmond Board of Education's de-
cision to close Ware High School in Augusta, Georgia. They based their
claim on the Board's failure to use tax funds to maintain a high school for
Black children while doing so for Whites. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the school officials from operating the school for White students as long
as Black students were deprived of the same opportunity.
The Richmond School Board argued that its decision to close the
Ware High School was made for "purely economical reasons in the edu-
cation of the Negro race." Thus Augusta officials justified their decision to
close the school in order to provide funding for four primary schools for
Black children. The Board traded the high school education of 60 Black
students for the elementary school level education of 300 Black students
who had been turned away by the system because of limited public re-
sources. Because Georgia law required that children be provided an
elementary school education,31 the Board argued that its choice to close
the high school was a reasonable choice. The Supreme Court agreed and
refused to stop White high school students from receiving their education
for the sake of Blacks.32 Though the plaintiffi did not challenge the school
system's segregation, the decision condoned the segregated school system
and gave support to it by recognizing the segregated funding system the
Board employed. In other words, the Board had a limited pool of money
for Black schools and it chose to allocate it all to fund elementary educa-
tion as required by the law, and no more. One scholar has argued that the
legality of segregation was not before the Court and thus not the conclu-
30. SeeJ. Morgan Kousser, Separate But Not Equal, 46 J. oF S. HIsT. 17,22 (1980).
31. Article VIII, sect. 1 of the Constitution of Georgia required that there to be a
"thorough system of common schools for the education of children in the elementary
branches of English education only, as nearly uniform as practicable, the expenses of which
shall be provided for by taxation, or otherwise. The schools shall be free to all children of
the State, but separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored races." Cum-
ming, 175 U.S. at 543.
32. The Court failed to acknowledge that the Board could have chosen to close the
high school it operated for Whites in order to educate the Black elementary students. Al-
ternatively, the Board might have raised taxes to provide for all White and Black students
who desired a high school education the option. In fact, in 1897, the Georgia legislature
increased state appropriations for education for the 1898 school term. Money was avail-
able. KousSER, supra note 30, at 27. Either closing the opportunity of a high school
education to both races or offering it to both races would have been more consistent with
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than to offer it to only
Whites.
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sion reached by Justice Harlan, who just three years before had dissented
in the Plessy case and did not approve of segregation.33 It is hard to recon-
cile the fact that Justice Harlan avoided the question of the validity of
school segregation and approved the separate and unequal funding of the
high schools with his dissent in Plessy and his disapproval of segregation. It
seems that Justice Harlan, at the very least, accepted the idea that the
Fourteenth Amendment allowed for some level of inequality in regard to
public funding.
Unsurprisingly, the Cumming plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief
failed. In fact, it is difficult to imagine that even Justice Harlan would stop
the educational progress ofWhites for the sake of Blacks, especially when
he concluded that the Black students "would not be advanced in the mat-
34ter of their education by" such a remedy. What stands out about the case
is the way the decision of the Court reinforces the Master Narrative of
White school board members and other politicians in the Jim Crow
South when it came to educating Blacks. The Justices accepted the idea
that there could be separate pools of money that could not be commin-
gled to support the schools. More importantly, the court affirmed the
Master Narrative about education for Blacks-that they should be edu-
cated but only to a certain degree. The idea of southern leaders was to
allow education in so far as it reinforced respect for property, industrious-
ness and efficient labor participation. In the words of the politicians, "We
must educate the Negro to be the best possible Negro and not a bad imi-
tation of a white man ... what [he] needs is to be taught and shown that
labor is his salvation-not books. The state appropriation is intended to
encourage that teaching.' 3 Thus, the education system served to subordi-
nate Blacks economically and politically.
Through recognition of the separate funding basis, the Court sup-
ported the political subordination of the Black citizens of Augusta. Blacks
paid taxes like Whites, but they were separate and subject to separate deci-
sions made by Whites with or without Black representation. It seems
unlikely that the Board's decision was based on "pure financial reasons in
the education of" Black children as it was for economic reasons in the
labor economy of the times. By accepting the Board's decision to limit
the educational opportunities of all Blacks--including those who were
educated at the elementary level, the Court gave weight to the economic
system where White decision makers could control the labor market by
giving Blacks only the education they needed for work in the agri-
economy controlled by Whites.
33. See C. Ellen Connally, Justice Harlan's "Great Betrayal"? A Reconsideration of
Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education,J. OF Sup. CT. HIsT. 72 (2000).
34. Cumming, 175 U.S. at 544.
35. LIT ACK, supra note 27, at 90-91.
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The harm caused by the Cumming decision was experienced by the
entire community as well as by the individuals who were denied the
benefit of an education. The harm included the reduction of political
power and economic capital that would come from having an educated
population. The Cumming decision also provided two important elements
for what was to become the constitutionally permissible model of educa-
tion for Blacks in the South. The first element was that of bifurcation of
the political system with separate funding and decision making in school
matters. The second element was more substantive. Cumming reinforced
the idea that limited educational access for Blacks was appropriate. Cum-
ming endorsed limited choice for Black students' education. Because this
latter element is more easily associated with individual rights than the
former, it fits more closely in the frame of the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection language. This element ultimately became the basis for
the Brown litigation.
Though it began as the work of those in a marginalized community,
Brown v. Board of Education ultimately became the source of the Master
Narrative on racial segregation in the country. Charles Hamilton Hous-
ton, whose work initiated Brown, has been called the father of the modern
civil rights movement and the man who killed Jim Crow.36 In 1919, after
serving in a segregated army in World War I, Houston came home in the
midst of the infamous "Red Summer" and enrolled in Harvard Law
School.37 Before his graduation, he would become the first Black to be an
editor of the Harvard Law Review38 After his graduation from law school,
he went into private practice and served on the faculty and in the ad-
ministration at Howard Law School.39 In the mid 1930's Houston began
to lay the groundwork for Brown v. Board of Education.4 °
Despite inadequate public support, communities of color established
some schools that were very successful in educating Brown and Black
students. Studies of successful, high-performing schools in the segregated
South reveal four common factors: 1) exemplary and highly dedicated
teachers; 2) rigorous curriculum; 3) committed parental support; and
4) strong administrative leadership. 41 However, the number of successful
segregated schools was limited. Lack of systemic improvement in their
36. See U. W Clemon & Bryan K. Fair, Making Bricks Without Straw: The NAACP
Legal Defense Fund and the Development of Civil Rights Law in Alabama 1940-1980, 52 ALA.
L. REv. 1121,1126 (2001).
37. See Robert L. Carter, In Tribute: Charles Hamilton Houston, 111 Htasv. L. REV.
2149, 2167 (1998).
38. Id. at 2168.
39. Id. at 2169.
40. See JACK GREENBERG, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: WITNESS TO A LANDMARK
DECISION 3-4 (2004).
41. See Vivian Gunn Morris & Curtis L. Morris, Before Brown, After Brown: What
Has Changed for African American Children?, 16 U. FLA.J. L. & PUB. POL'y 215 (2005).
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children's education led some Black and Latino parents to believe that
integrating schools was the only way to ensure that their children received
the same quality education as White children. Thus, lawsuits and other
initiatives, which began as efforts to provide high schools for Latinos and
Blacks, broadened into challenges to segregated school systems. Commu-
nity leaders later convinced parents that education could be an avenue for
dismantling the system of subordination and oppression that school segre-
gation represented. Parents, motivated by the prospect of improved
educational outcomes, allowed their children to be part of a legal strategy
to combat all segregation. The involvement of Latino and Black parents
with high expectations for improved socio-economic conditions was cru-
cial to sustaining the integration litigation. Many minority parents also
saw involvement in their children's education as critical to the achieve-
ment of positive outcomes in school and beyond. 2
Brown was not just one case. It was a series of cases that, over two
decades, set the legal stage for cases ultimately argued and won in the Su-
preme Court by Thurgood Marshall. Brown invalidated the segregated
school systems that dominated the South and existed throughout the
country, and declared that in the area of education, separate schools were
inherently unequal and thus unconstitutional. 3 Yet, Brown only eliminated
the most extreme choice, outright segregation by law of the races. Brown
left many options that allowed for the exclusion of Black and Brown chil-
dren from the educational opportunities it promised. It did little to
address the political choices that city and county officials made that re-
sulted in disparate funding, nor did it stop school officials from
segregating students through tracking and learning classifications. More-
over, Brown allowed for private choices ofWhite parents to flee inner-city
school districts or send their children to private academies and drain
abandoned public schools of funding.
Central to the Master Narrative of the Supreme Court Brown deci-
sions were two themes that encouraged the choices that undermined the
cases' potential: 1) Segregation and racial inequality harmed only Black
school children; 2) Equality could be achieved only through a limited
effort aimed at banning segregation. It is important to note that Brown did
not articulate a mandate for integration, nor did it acknowledge the
greater societal harm of the problem of racism as expressed in segrega-
tion.44 Brown may have rejected de jure "white privilege:' but it did
nothing to stop advantages attributable to race not mandated by law. As
one commentator stated, "In failing to clearly expose the real inequities
produced by segregation, the status quo of substantive disadvantage was
42. See Molly Townes O'Brien, Brown on the Ground:A Journey of Faith in Schooling,
35 U.TOL. L. R-Ev. 813, 818 (2004).
43. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
44. Perhaps the strongest mandate for integration was made by Justice O'Connor in
Grutter. See discussion of Grutter infra, pp. 79-84.
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ratified."4 Eventually, the limited view of racism's impact served as the
basis for education cases to follow. The normative role that future educa-
tion cases would play was framed by the perspective on racism adopted by
the Court.
There may be many reasons that the Court failed to adopt a more
textual approach to interpretation of the 14th Amendment. There is even
the suggestion that in developing the strategy leading to Brown, the
NAACP, after Houston, intentionally disregarded issues of funding dis-
parities and instead focused on segregation. 6 School officials opposing the
Brown decisions argued that it involved both the Supreme Court and
other federal courts in issues that were outside of the scope of the judici-
ary. Though Brown marked a sea change in favor of the civil rights
movement, 7 it did not produce a solution to the problem of discrimina-
tion and inequities in public education.48 Whatever the reason for the
Court's language, it has had an overall limiting impact in creating equality
and ultimately ending the disparities that Marshall and Houston sought to
address. The broader notion of the harm of segregation and thus broad
based ideas about how to end it were lost in the interpretative narrative of
the courts following Brown. Brown was not a bad decision, and it certainly
was not a wrong decision. It was simply a limited decision, in part because
of the limited perspective the Court had on race.
As the preeminent case on the issue of race and education, Brown
left a legacy and message that are monumental. The limiting message of
Brown was so strong that even in the period from the 1960s to the mid-
1970s when desegregation efforts were at their height, rarely did the
breadth of the problems in education get expressed in a way other than in
the narrative as understood by the Supreme Court. However, this is not
surprising. It reflects the power of legal precedent. Many of the strategies
that immediately followed the decision and policies of the day suffered
from this limited message. For example, resistance to desegregation efforts,
the advancement of the colorblind standard of constitutional interpreta-
45. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HAsv. L. REv. 1707, 1753 (1993).
46. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform,
48 VAtN. L. REv. 101,122 (1995).
47. See Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118
HA~v. L. REV. 973, 976 (2005) (describing the decision as one of "revolution in law and
justice" and positing that America might be a very different place if not for the Brown
decision).
48. Many commenting at the 50th anniversary mark of the Brown decision la-
mented the fact that today's urban schools continue to be segregated by race and in many
cases provide inadequate education for Black and Brown youth. See, e.g., Gary Orfield,
Why Segregation is Inherently Unequal: The Abandonment of Brown and the Continuing Failure of
Plessy, 49 N.YL. ScH. L. REv. 1041 (2004); see also CHALEs J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBER-
ATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
(2004).
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tion, as well as the No Child Left Behind Act can be traced to one or
both of the limiting themes of the Master Narrative of Brown.
The Counter Narrative coming out of the Black community
around the integration movement was that segregation was political, legal,
social and economic poison and that a whole host of barriers had to be
broken down to achieve equality.49 This broader notion of the evil of seg-
regation was particularly evident in the life and work of Charles
Hamilton Houston. In his work leading up to Brown, Houston chronicled
the disparities in general funding methods, facilities, teachers salaries, cur-
riculum, school attendance requirements, per pupil expenditures, housing,
employment and income among many aspects of life that were held hos-
tage by legally sanctioned segregation. The Counter Narrative recognized
that racism had permeated nearly every aspect of the lives of people of
color and that equality could not be achieved by desegregation alone.
Civil rights advocates developed advanced nationwide policy and litiga-
tion strategies that recognized the all-encompassing nature of the
problem. The strategies included supplemental federal funding in the form
of Title I, challenges to school funding methods, and the promotion of
affirmative action to increase integration at the higher education level.
II. FEDERAL POLICY AND EDUCATIONAL DISPARITIES
For equality advocates, the limitations of litigation strategy in ending
disparities became evident in the years following Brown. The massive resis-
tance to the Brown mandate as well as Brown's structural limitations
hampered the efforts of lawyers and policy makers who sought equal
education for Black children. In response, equality advocates proposed
new redistributive measures aimed at the education system's financial in-
equities. As part of his "War on Poverty' President Lyndon Johnson
signed into law Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965.50 The aim of Title I was to close the educational gap between poor
children and middle class children by allocating federal funding to schools
with high percentages of low-income students. The impact of racism on
49. Interestingly, the breadth of the impact of racial distinctions can be traced back
to the abolitionist attacks on slavery and even to the language of William Lloyd Garrison
who believed that the original U.S. Constitution was irreparably flawed because it recog-
nized slavery as legitimate. Under Garrison's leadership, the Anti-Slavery Society
pronounced the Constitution "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell" because
of its failure to abolish slavery in the newly formed United States. Garrison argued that
the entire document should be redone to rid it of the taint of racial animus. See HENRY
MAYER, ALL ON FIRE: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY 327 (St.
Martin's Press 1998).
50. James S. Liebman & Charles F Sabel, Symposium: Changing Schools:A Public Labo-
ratory Dewey Barely Imagine: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28
NYU. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 183,283 n.430 (2003).
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public education was such that many, though not all low income schools
were majority minority. Title I is essentially an annual bloc grant to state
educational agencies accompanied by requirements to target the funds
towards programs that benefit educationally-disadvantaged students. How-
ever, the federal allocation of funds to local educational facilities has never
been enough to bring parity to the public school system. Wealthier dis-
tricts often have per pupil expenditures that double those of poorer
school districts."1 The huge disparities in expenditures have lead to a
number of lawsuits aimed at equalizing funding for schools largely popu-
lated by poor minority children. 2
In his 2006 budget request, President George W Bush asked Con-
gress for a total of 13.3 billion dollars for Title I funding of elementary
and secondary schools. This represents an increase of over 4.6 billion dol-
lars since the No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLB") was introduced.
According to the federal government, the increase would help states meet
the accountability requirements of the NCLB and provide support for
expanded school choice for parents and students. 3 Gary Orfield, Co-
Director of The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University argues that in
order to effect change in the education system in general, society must
pay attention to the relationship between race and poverty.14 He suggests
that a combination of school accountability that protects vulnerable mi-
nority students is imperative.5 At its core, Title I aims to compensate
students for the effects of poverty upon their schooling. As conceived, it
suggested that desegregation alone would not bring about an end to dis-
parities and it recognized the link between race and poverty. But as the
funds are directed toward the goals of NCLB, it risks losing the connec-
tion Orfield speaks of and deviates from its initial message.
Current policy does little to link the problems of poverty, race and
achievement gaps to the solution of funding found in Title I. While Title I
links economic disadvantage to educational programs, it does not go far
enough. The amount of funding is too small to overcome the disparities
51. See San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1973), (estimating that total
state and local per pupil contribution to some predominantly Mexican-American school
districts totaled $248 while the contribution in the most affluent and prominently "Anglo"
districts was $558 per pupil). See also id. at n.38 (containing the findings of the District
Court which outline disparities in state and local spending that range from $815 per pupil
in wealthier districts to $305 in poorer districts).
52. See discussions of San Antonio v. Rodriguez and state funding lawsuits infa.
53. See U.S. Department of Education, ESEA Title I LEA Allocations-FY06, at
http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/titlei/fy06/index.html (last modified Oct.
16, 2006). See discussion of NCLB infra.
54. American Youth Policy Forum, The Reauthorization of ESEA Title I, at http://
www.aypf.org/forumbriefs/1999/fb041299.htm (last visited Nov. 7,2006).
55. Id. See also Harvard Graduate School of Education, Hard Work for Good Schools:
Facts not Fads in Title I Reform, The Civil Rights Project http://www.gse.harvard.edu/
newsevents/features/1999/orfieldtitleO4l999.html (last modified Aug. 16, 2006).
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and in targeting educational outcomes does little to address other prob-
lems associated with poverty such as health and housing. These factors are
"likely to have a palpable effect on academic achievement."56
Concurrent with legislative efforts like Title I aimed at ending fund-
ing disparities, civil rights advocates pursued litigation in the federal
courts, which specifically addressed the systematic basis for disparities in
funding. This effort combined equality arguments with redistribution
strategies. The first round of funding cases found itself in the expression of
federal constitutional challenges to school funding practices. This effort
harkened back to Houston's early work and his documentation of the
outright funding disparities that existed pre-Brown. Brown and its progeny
certainly outlawed the kind of separate funding bases present in the
Richmond School District and the Cumming case, as well as clear and de-
liberate decisions to underfund schools on the basis of race. However,
local funding disparities continued, Brown and Title I notwithstanding.
By the 1970s, it was clear that the disparities in school funding were
substantial and pervasive. What was also clear was that neither existing
local, state or even federal efforts at finance reform nor school integration
were going to correct the disparities. According to Erwin Chemerinsky:
In 1972, education expert Christopher Jencks estimated that, on av-
erage, each white child received fifteen to twenty percent more in
education funding than each black child . This trend continues through-
out the country. For example, in the school year 1988-89, the Chicago
public schools spent $5,265 for each student's education; but in the Niles
school system, just north of the city, $9,371 was spent on each student's
schooling. That same year, Camden, New Jersey spent $3,538 on each
pupil; but Princeton, New Jersey spent $7,725. These disparities also cor-
respond to race. For example, in Chicago, 45.4% of the students were
white and 39.1% were African American; in Niles Township, the schools
were 91.6% white and 0.4% black."'
Two related factors contribute to the funding disparities, property
taxes and politics. In the United States, the system for funding public
schools has been relatively unchanged since the 1800's.' 9 States delegate
the role of drawing school districts to local authorities. These districts are
drawn on the basis of housing patterns and with little or no regard to
56. RIcHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND EDU-
CATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLAcK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 3 (Teachers College
Columbia University, 2004).
57. See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY
AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 27 (Harper Colophon Books 1973).
58. Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52
AM. U. L. REV. 1461, 1470 (2003).
59. Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integra-
tion of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1348 (2004).
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equalizing tax bases from district to district.60 Since local property taxes
are the major source of school funding, disparities will naturally occur in
most districts. Some districts include areas where property values are high
and provide a higher tax base. In other districts in the same system prop-
erty values and thus taxes are very low. In addition, the tax rate may not
tell the complete story. "Wealthier suburbs have significantly larger tax
bases than poor inner cities.The result is that suburbs can tax at a low rate
and still have a great deal to spend on education. Cities must tax at a
higher rate and nonetheless have less to spend."
61
In 1968, in conjunction with the "War on Poverty" parties at-
tempted to utilize the courts to supplement the equalization goals ofTitle
I. Litigants began to challenge the tax bases for funding local schools. In
essence, they argued that the disparities in funding from district to district
within school systems amounted to unequal protection under the law. The
cases culminated in a lawsuit aimed at school officials in San Antonio,
Texas where the funding system taxed poor districts at a high rate, but still
left them with little money to spend on education. In some poor districts,
per pupil funding was close to half that of per pupil spending in wealthier
districts. The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that this
method of distribution impacted a class that warranted protection as "sus-
pect" and invoking "strict scrutiny" review.62 The Court also concluded
that the federal Constitution provided no fundamental right to an educa-
63tion. The court rejected the students' argument that education was so
inextricably linked to the "exercise of constitutional rights such as free-
dom of speech and voting" as to amount to a fundamental right on its
own.64 The court posited that this linkage would force the consideration
of whether the Constitution thus created protections for other "basic
human needs such as subsistence and housing., 65 As Justice Douglas
pointed out in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, a later
school case, the Supreme Court told poor people that they must pay their
own way to equal educational opportunity.
66
Thus Rodriguez limited the federal judiciary's involvement with re-
gard to inequities in funding public in education and furthered the Master
Narrative that equality could be achieved through the limited effort of
effective desegregation. The Court, at least by implication, refused to
make the link between race and the poverty of the largely Latino students
60. Id.
61. Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 1470.
62. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,28-29 (1972).
63. Id.
64. Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 1471.
65. Id.
66. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,760 (1974) (Douglass,J. dissenting).
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in San Antonio's poorer schools.67 At the same time, the federal court sys-
tem withdrew much of its support for the desegregation effort, in essence
reinforcing the idea that segregation, racial inequality, harmed only Black
and Brown children. Rodriguez was a retreat from what civil rights advo-
cates hoped would be an emerging narrative of equality. Milliken v. Bradley
soon followed and even further reduced the government's participation in
desegregation efforts by limiting the federal court's ability to involve sub-
urban districts in urban school district desegregation plans.68 Both cases
reflect the unwillingness of the Court to address the role political con-
structs played in limiting education, even in the face of evidence that they
may have been conceived in an effort to avoid integration. In Rodriguez,
the Court failed to recognize an individual or a community injury in the
funding basis. As with the Cumming Court, the Milliken and Rodriguez
Courts allowed the sanctity of political boundaries and decisions to over-
ride the interest of equality. Thus on the federal Constitutional front,
successful efforts to limit segregation and its related disparities in funding
were waning.
Not surprisingly, as federal courts pulled back on their willingness to
oversee the administration of desegregation efforts, a new ideology
emerged. The colorblind standard in legal reasoning received renewed
attention. The rise of the colorblind standard reflects the times. It is an
articulation of a subtext of the theme that minimal efforts at desegrega-
tion of schools were enough to end the problem of racism. Moreover, the
idea of the Constitution as colorblind gave spiritual and ethical mooring
to the Master Narrative. The modern colorblind standard developed from
a rejected and even, at the time, idyllic vision first introduced in a dissent
in Plessy v. Ferguson, the decision that locked segregation into place.69 Yet,
today, many argue that it is the measure by which all law and social policy
should be governed.70
67. For a discussion of the complex relationship of school desegregation and school
financing litigation see Goodwin Liu, The Parted Paths of School Desegregation and School
Finance Litigation, 24 LAw & INEQ. 81 (2006). Professor Liu offers a compelling analysis of
Rodriguez, which suggests that the goal of redistributing resources for education and that
of ending educational disparities were set on divergent paths by the Court's disparate reso-
lutions in Rodriguez and a desegregation case argued on the same day, Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.
1, Denver, Col., 413 U.S. 189 (1973). See also Charles Berger, Equity Without Adjudication:
Kansas School Finance Reform and the 1992 School District Finance and Quality Performance Act,
27 J.L. & EDUc. 1, 16 (1998) (positing that whether the goals of public finance reform
were "educational equity, taxpayer equity [or] adequacy" is unclear).
68. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741.
69. See Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).As the
sole dissenter in the landmark case that declared "separate but equal" the law of the land
under the equal protection clause, Harlan declared that the 13th and 14th Amendments
should be "color blind."
70. See, e.g., PEteR WOOD, DIVERSrrv: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT (2003) and Peter
H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present and Future, 20 YALE L. & PoL'Y Ray. 1 (2004). In
Adarand Contractors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Court adopts the colorblind standard
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Proponents of the colorblindness concept argue that the considera-
tion of race in any form is unconstitutional and that a permissible state
rule or process must be "race neutral" In fact, they argue that any racial
consideration violates the "central purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause" to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between
individuals on the basis of race.
As attractive as the colorblind concept is today, it is difficult to be-
lieve that it was not the legal or social imperative historically. It was, in
fact, a concept the court outright rejected in 1896 in its Plessy v. Fergusont
decision. Race consciousness prevailed as the ideological underpinning
for most social and legal policy and governed much individual behavior
until the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.
Plessy, in sanctioning race consciousness, made race neutrality an impossi-
bility, because over time it institutionalized race as a decision making
factor.
In 1979 law Professor William Van Alstyne denounced Supreme
Court Justice Harry Blackman's opinion in Bakke v. University of Califor-
nia72 which allowed race as a consideration in California's medical school
admissions policies. Blackman argued that tailored race conscious strate-
gies were necessary in order to "get beyond racism." Van Alstyne
responded that
[G]etting beyond racism in this fashion ... is as little likely to
succeed as the now discredited idea that in order to 'get be-
yond' organized government it is first indispensable to organize
a virtual dictatorship that, once it extirpates the evils that made
organized government necessary, will itselfjust naturally wither
away. We have not seen governments wither by the paradox of
assigning them even greater powers. We shall not now see ra-
cism disappear by employing its own ways of classifying people
and of measuring their rights. Rather, one gets beyond racism
by getting beyond it now; by a complete, resolute and credible
commitment never to tolerate in one's own life-or in the life
or practice of one's government-the differential treatment of
other human beings by race.]
Van Alstyn's argument suggests that colorblindness, is the only anti-
dote to racism. He argues powerfully against any application of color
consciousness in governmental decision making. As articulated by modern
of review for federal affirmative action programs. But see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our
Constitution Is Colorblind," 44 STAN. L. Rv. 1 (1991) andJ. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND
INJUSTICE (1999).
71. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550.
72. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
73. COSE, COLOR-BLINDNESS 99-100 (1997) quotingVan Alstyn, Rites of Passage Race,
the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, U. Cm. L. REV. 56, 775-810.(1979).
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proponents like Van Alstyn, the colorblind standard is a product of racial
guilt and government mistrust. This approach reflects a fundamentalist
concept of constitutional protections against racism that ignores the tex-
ture of reality that racism has created. Again, this supports the idea that a
narrow approach to ending segregation is all that is needed to its extreme.
Even as conceived, the colorblind standard had its limitation which
modern proponents have not reconciled, not the least of which is that it
fails to address the racial correlated social disparities plaguing this Ameri-
can society throughout its history. The originator of the "color blind"
constitution was Justice John Harlan, the author of the Cumming opinion.
In his dissent in Plessy, Justice Harlan argued that the law "takes no ac-
count of ... color.' 74 Yet, even in his dissent, Harlan never advocated for
social equality of Blacks and Whites. 5 One is left to conclude that Justice
Harlan endorsed a colorblind standard that would have allowed for deci-
sions that were reasonable despite their negative impact. Such is the case
under modern day applications of the colorblind standard, where deci-
sions leave in place the vestiges of past prejudices and presumptions of
76inferiority under the guise of race neutral choices.
A. State Constitutions, School Financing Litigation, and Disparities
The Counter Narrative continued in litigation form in two more
waves of school financing cases. This time, the cases were in state and not
federal courts. One wave of litigation relied on state constitutional texts
with explicit reference to education as a state constitutional right. Such a
reference to education is clear in at least 49 of 50 state constitutions and
has produced a series of state court cases challenging funding on two dis-
tinct bases.
Almost immediately after Rodriguez was decided, new school finance
cases were initiated. This litigation focused on funding equality arguments
and redistribution of resources from wealthier districts. From 1974-1989,
these cases, often referred to as the "second wave" were largely based on
equal protection clauses found in the various state constitutions. However,
issues of residence and taxation, generally localized and complex, were
difficult for courts to remedy. Early suits resulted in victories for the states.
Also, equality did not necessarily provide a satisfactory solution because
while initially and philosophically appealing, it could produce less envi-
able results 7 With limited funds, equality would mean lowering funding
and the competitive edge found in wealthier school districts rather than
74. 163 U.S. at 559.
75. See id.
76. See Bryan K. Fair, Why Grutter Will Help Very Little, 78 TbL. L. Rav. 1843
(2005).
77. Enrich, supra note 46.
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merely increasing the wealth and educational opportunities afforded to
poorer districts. 78 This "Robin Hood" philosophy did not yield success
judicially or legislatively, given the political power of wealthier districts.
The nexus was not yet right for equal educational opportunity to emerge
as a Master Narrative.
Importantly, the third wave of education litigation, from 1989 to
present, shifted strategy. Third wave litigants learned from the failures of
the second wave of cases. Instead of focusing on the equality of education,
they shifted their focus to the actual level of education provided by the
various school districts and whether the education provided was adequate
to prepare children to be successful members of society. "Educational ade-
quacy" was based, in part, on the explicit textual language of state
constitutions making education a fundamental right, as well as statewide
accountability initiatives, which provided judicially manageable standards.
Most of the 50 states, whose constitutions were reviewed for this re-
port, have an education clause. Kentucky merely provides for "an efficient
system of common schools throughout the State, 79 while Massachusetts
acknowledges that it is the "duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all fu-
ture periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature
and the sciences" which are necessary to achieving "wisdom, and knowl-
edge, as well as virtue."0 NewYork offers to "provide for the maintenance
and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children
of this state may be educated""' and in New Jersey, "the Legislature shall
provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient sys-
tem of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the
State between the ages of five and eighteen years. ' 2
Education adequacy evokes a New Deal Pattern of legislation. In
creating accountability initiatives, legislators deliberately leave key terms
or outcomes undefined and mandates under-funded. Such constructions
are thus delegated to the courts. While such legislation often results in
fragmentation of power and conflict between branches of government, it
also allows for incremental policy implementation and ongoing social and
legal construction of desired policy outcomes. Education advocates have
used this approach, quite successfully, in the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA). In EAHCA, courts were given
significant latitude in defining disability and free and appropriate public
education. The policy goals of EAHCA have, in large part, been achieved.
Adequacy offered courts a rationale for plaintiff victories. It is not
clear whether adequacy litigation led to statewide accountability initia-
78. Id.
79. KY. CONST. § 183.
80. MASS. CONST., pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2.
81. N.Y CONST. art. XL, § 1.
82. NJ. CONST. art.VIII,§ 4, 1.
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tives or whether the initiatives led to adequacy. However, both, as de-
signed, work in tandem to improve educational outcomes for poor
children. Statewide accountability initiatives eventually put structural and
political foundations in place for our nationwide movement towards stan-
dards. Arguably, the federal No Child Left Behind Act originated from the
Texas accountability initiative. Whatever the source, the result of this legis-
lation was a cementing of a "standards perspective" that spread to the
federal level. This represents only a part of the impact of NCLB. A full
discussion of the significance of the policy including its impact on deseg-
regation is included below.
B. The Move from Equality to Adequacy
The failure of the plaintiffs in San Antonio v. Rodriguez to prevail in
their claim for a federally constitutional right to an education and the
deference the court showed to states in determining their tax structures
meant that there would be no federally mandated reallocation of funds in
local school settings absent and absolute denial of benefits.8 3 It also meant
that there would be no uniform standard for providing education for
children from state to state. Lack of federal equal protection means that,
for example, Connecticut can provide more for its students than its
neighboring states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island and the students in
the latter states have no basis for complaint. The funding litigation moved
from the federal court to state courts with each state providing its own
definition for the state's obligation. At the same time, new legal rhetoric
was coined. Instead of focusing on equality under the federal constitution,
the litigation sought adequacy under various provisions in state constitu-
tions throughout the country.
1. Kentucky
In the first significant adequacy case, the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky reviewed both the equality and adequacy of the state's public school
system. 84 The court articulated a substantive standard in the form of
seven capabilities" as follows:
° sufficient oral and written communication skills to en-
able students to function in a complex and rapidly
changing civilization;
" sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political
systems to enable students to make informed choices;
83. 411 U.S. 1,28-29 (1972).
84. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
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" sufficient understanding of governmental processes to en-
able the student to understand the issues that affect his or
her community, state, and nation;
" sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her
mental and physical wellness;
sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage;
" sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in
either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each
child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and
" sufficient level of academic or vocational skills to enable
public school students to compete favorably with their
counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the
job market.8s
Basing its decision only on the Kentucky Constitution's education
clause, the court found that "Kentucky's entire system of common schools
is unconstitutional.' 86 The breadth of the court's decision is worth noting.
In effect, the court called for a change in the entirety of the system, in-
cluding the programmatic content, not just in financing as had been the
challenge in San Antonio v. Rodriguez. "While the Kentucky court simulta-
neously addressed the severe inequalities in the state's financing system
and found that the state's education clause required substantial uniformity
of resources, its findings of substantive inadequacy played a central role in
its declaration that 'the whole gamut of the common school system in
Kentucky' and not just the education finance structure, failed to pass con-
stitutional muster."
87
2. Massachusetts
Four years later, Massachusetts adopted Kentucky's "seven capabili-
ties" in McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education.88 The case
was first brought under the "equality" rationale, but plaintiffs amended
their complaint "to refocus on the claim that the substantive quality of the
education provided in the plaintiff's poor districts did not satisfy the legis-
lature's constitutional [duty] .. *,89 In what is later described by some as
overreaching, "the court ... directed its inquiry to the qualitative demands
implicit in the constitutional text, ultimately adopting the same list of
85. Id. at 212.
86. Id. at 215.
87. Enrich, supra note 46, at 140-41.
88. 615 N.E.2d 516 (1993).
89. Enrich, supra note 46, at 141.
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guidelines previously used by the Kentucky court."90 The Massachusetts
Court did not adopt these capabilities out of thin air, rather there was
legislation, the Massachusetts Education Reform Act, in the works and in
fact passed just days after the Court's McDuffy decision.
In 2004, Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Margot Botsford con-
cluded that adequacy was impacted by "inadequate financial resources" at
both the local level and the state oversight level.91 She directed that costs
associated with implementing all seven of the Massachusetts curriculum
frameworks be established.92 A year later, in Hancock v. the Commissioner of
Education, the Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC"), reviewed Judge Botsford's
decision.93 While Hancock provided an opportunity to help define "ade-
quacy" in terms of implementation of the state curriculum frameworks, in
the end the court relinquished any role or responsibility and left such pol-
94icy decisions to the elected branches of the state government.
The plurality opinion in Hancock represents two interesting devel-
opments in adequacy litigation. First, courts are hesitant to step into this
policy arena, lest they overstep their powers by intervening in an area re-
served for the legislature. Second, by finding that the policy of setting the
parameters of adequacy was a non-justiciable issue, the SJC notes that had
the issue been raised as one of equal protection or due process, it would
have been within the court's domain to decide. So while the SJC did not
define "adequacy" in Hancock, the door is left open for the court's in-
volvement.
While the Chief Justice "reaffirmed" the "constitutional imperative"
found in the McDuffy case, she refused to find that the current situation in
the four focus districts failed to meet the constitutional mandate. Citing
the McDuffy decision and the education clause of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution, there is an "enforceable duty on the magistrates and Legislatures
of this Commonwealth to provide education in the public schools for the
children there enrolled, whether they be rich or poor and without regard to
the fiscal capacity of the community or district in which such children
live."9s Further, "[t]his reflects the conviction of the people of Massachusetts
that, because education is 'fundamentally related to the very existence of
government the Commonwealth has a constitutional duty to prepare all of
its children 'to participate as free citizens of a free State to meet the needs
and interests of a republican government, namely the Commonwealth of
90. Id.
91. Hancock v. Driscoll, 2004 WL 877984 (Mass. Super.Apr. 26, 2004).
92. Id.
93. 443 Mass. 428, 445 (Mass. 2005).
94. This decision has been criticized as a return to pre-Brown days where "a high
court says the children of the public schools must continue to suffer the state's sloth." Der-
rick Z.Jackson, Separate and Unequal Schools, THE BOSTON GLOBE, at A19 (Feb. 18, 2005).
95. Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 443 Mass. 428, 431 (2005) (Marshall, CJ., con-
curring), citing McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 545, 621 (1993).
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Massachusetts ,,96 This is the "constitutional imperative" the Chief Justice
applied in determining whether the Commonwealth is currently meeting
its "duty to educate.
97
She distinguished the school system in the McDuffy decision as one
where the Commonwealth had completely abdicated its constitutional
duty to the local communities. 9 With the passage of the Education Re-
form Act in 1993, three days after the McDuffy decision, the Legislature
had taken back its constitutional mandate and established a foundation
budget, curriculum frameworks, and had reviewed the certification and
tenure of public school teachers. 99 In such an environment, in spite of the
"painfully slow process" in which changes were achieved, the Chief Jus-
tice reasoned she could not find that the Commonwealth was neglecting
its constitutional duty, as was the case when McDuffy was decided.' °°
The analysis of the Commonwealth's constitutional duty and the
Legislature's response indicates and may be predictive of a minimal role
for the court to play in education policy. The language the court uses sug-
gests that it is applying a rational review test. The legislature's response:
While the plaintiffi have amply shown that many children in
the focus districts are not being well served by their school dis-
tricts, they have not shown that the defendants are acting in an
arbitrary, non-responsive, or irrational way to meet the consti-
tutional mandate.'0'
Where the Commonwealth's "abdication" of its constitutional duty in
the McDuffy era would not pass a rational review, the legislature's passing of
the ERA and subsequent funding does pass constitutional muster. Since the
Commonwealth is not "neglecting" its duties, no judicial intervention is
required. 1
0 2
Further, "[t]he court has not been called on to interpret the equal
protection and due process provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution,
nor are we confronted with a wholesale abandonment of children that the
record in [the McDuffy, Brown, and Deshaney] cases evidenced."'0'3 Judicial
intervention is limited to situations like McDuffy where the Common-
wealth has entirely neglected its constitutional duty to educate and
situations where the justiciability of the issue is unquestionable, such as
interpreting the equal protection or due process constitutional provisions.
96. Id. at 431.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 433.
99. Id. at 432.
100. Id. at 434.
101. Id. at 435.
102. Id. at 457.
103. Id.
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Therefore, the political question doctrine is a significant impediment for
courts in adequacy litigation and the door is still ajar for equality litigation
under equal protection or due process.
Where Chief Justice Marshall's plurality opinion underscores the
limited role the court may play in reviewing legislative educational policy,
both dissenting opinions assert a role for the court.
Unlike the plurality justices, Justice Greaney, the author of the dis-
sent, writes that the plaintiff's situation requires relief from this court.10
The constitutional duty to educate means that all of the Commonwealth's
students "have a reasonable opportunity to acquire an adequate education,
within the meaning of McDuffy, in the public schools of their communi-
ties." 105 Whether the Commonwealth is meeting its duty should be a
results-oriented evaluation, rather than the effort-oriented evaluation sug-
gested by the Chief Justice's opinion.16 Since the results in the four focus
districts were found to be seriously lacking, Justice Greaney would re-
mand the case for remedial supervision of the process so that "the court
will play a vital role in ensuring that the Commonwealth's public schools
are adequately financed [which] would not intrude on the other two
branches. 10 7 Justice Greaney, cognizant of the political issue, advocates a
position of the three branches of government working collectively on
education adequacy. 08
With Hancock, the Massachusetts SJC delivered a set-back to the use
of adequacy for improving educational opportunity and outcomes for
disadvantaged children in state courts. While state courts have invalidated
funding schemes on adequacy grounds, they might not invalidate inade-
quate educational opportunities or outcomes on the education clause
alone (if other state courts follow Massachusetts). This means that plaintiffs
will need a new, or at least altered, strategy to continue to successfully
litigate the issue of disparities and increasing stratification of educational
opportunity in our public schools. One possibility, suggested by the Han-
cock decision, is for plaintiffs to use both the education and the equal
protection clauses in state constitutions. Equal protection is clearly a justi-
ciable issue. Maybe in the context of equal protection, state courts will be
more comfortable assessing whether children receive equal educational
opportunities to public education. Perhaps the Massachusetts SJC has
highlighted the appropriate legal pathway, one that meshes adequacy and
equality, state constitution education clauses and equal protection, to
move us toward equal educational opportunity for all children. Yet the
104. Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 443 Mass. 428, 473 (Mass. 2005) (Greaney, J.,
dissenting).
105. Id. at 479.
106. Id. at 481.
107. Id. at 480.
108. Id.
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SJC's decisions in McDuffy and Hancock show that the path adequacy liti-
gators take to reaching their goal does not always follow a straight line.
Of course, adequacy litigation also continues in various states
throughout the country. Other important state court decisions noted be-
low indicate the various ways courts have found and defined the right to
an education.
3. Wisconsin
In an adequacy case that arrived at the Supreme Court ofWisconsin
in 2000, the court addressed two issues.' °9 First, it tested the constitution-
ality of the state school finance systems under the education clause." °
Next, it tested the constitutionality of the system under equal protec-
tion.I" The court applied the rational basis test used in the Supreme
Court decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez to the
petitioner's claim."2 The court concluded that the "legislative classifica-
tions set forth in Wis. Stat. ch. 121 [and the state financing system were]
rationally related to the purpose of educating Wisconsin's children."' 3 The
court found that
Wisconsin students have a fundamental right to an equal op-
portunity for a sound basic education" defined as one that will
provide an "opportunity for students to be proficient in
mathematics, science, reading and writing, geography, and his-
tory, and for them to receive instruction in the arts and music,
vocational training, social sciences, health, physical education
and foreign language, in accordance with their age and apti-
tude."''
4
The court also concluded that the state's fiscal obligation was to provide
"sufficient resources so that school districts offer students the equal op-
portunity for a basic education as required by the constitution, the state
school finance system will pass constitutional muster.'""'
Wisconsin's state constitution education clause contains a "uniform-
ity" provision, which mandates that the legislature is to provide schools
"which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable." 6 The court interpreted
this detail in the clause to relate to the "character of instruction" and not
109. Vincent v.Voight, 614 N.W2d 388,396 (Wis. 2000).
110. Id. at 397.
111. Id. at 413.
112. Id. at 414.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 415.
115. Id.
116. WIs. CONST. art. X, § 3.
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the "method of forming school districts"."7 Further, the court defined
"[c]haracter of instruction" as "the training that these schools should give
to the future citizens ofWisconsin."
118
4. NewYork
The Campaign for Fiscal Equity ("CFE") cases are at the heart of
NewYork's adequacy litigation. CFE brought suit in 1995, at which point
the New York Court of Appeals announced a "sound basic education"
standard and remanded the case to the trial court to gather evidence on
what constitutes such an education. 9 The trial court's general conclusion
provided that "[p]roductive citizenship means more than just being quali-
fied to vote or serve as a juror, but to do so capably and knowledgeably."' 
20
In 2002, the NewYork Supreme Court reviewed the trial court de-
cision and cited the "sound basic education" standard, as announced by
the Court of Appeals, that "requires the State to provide a minimally ade-
quate educational opportunity, but not ... to guarantee some higher,
largely unspecified level of education, as laudable as that goal might be.
'121
This minimally adequate education standard relates to facilities, instru-
mentalities of education, teaching quality, and curriculum.1 22 Under this
standard, the court found that the State's method of funding was constitu-
tional, reversing the lower court.1
3
The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the New York Su-
preme Court's decision, stating "voters should have the cognitive skills and
the level of knowledge necessary as voters to be able to identify their own
political interests, to find information relevant to those interests, and to
assess this information ... in light of those interests."12 4 While the court
cited various pending reforms, it based its decision on the record before it,
rather than on the possible results of such reforms. 125 In light of that record,
the court found that the state funding system dramatically underfinanced
New York City schools. The court ordered the state to determine the
117. 614 N.W2d at 402.
118. Id. at 409.
119. CFE v. State, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565,569 (Ct.App. 1995).
120. Michael Rebell, Adequacy Litigation: A New Path to Equity, in BRINGING EQUITY
BACK 291, 306 (Janice Petrovich and Amy Stuart Wells ed., New York: Teachers College
Press, 2004) (quoting CFE v. State, 719 N YS.2d 475 (N. Y 2001)).
121. CFE v. State, 794 N.Y.S.2d 130, 134 (A.D. 1 Dept. 2002).
122. Id. at 135.
123. Id. at 148.
124. See Rebell, supra note 120, at 307.
125. CFE v. State, 769 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Ct. App. 2003).
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amount it would cost to offer each of the city's students a "sound basic
education" and then to provide the funding.
1 2 6
The Court of Appeals addressed the political question issue in the
opinion, but the issue did not impede it from ordering a cost study and
appropriate reforms. The court specifically addressed the dissent by defin-
ing its role as one of "assur[ing] the protection of constitutional rights"
rather than making educational policy.127 However, the court recognized
that it lacked authority to "micromanage education financing" and that it
must "defer to the Legislature in matters of policymaking, particularly in a
matter so vital as education financing ... "8
While the outcome of the court-ordered study is still unknown,
CFE is optimistic."9 "The New York Court of Appeals' holding that stu-
dents must be prepared to be capable citizens and the trial court's detailed
analysis of the specific skills and the level of cognitive functioning that
students need to function in that manner are likely to inspire similar
analyses and analogous holdings by other courts."'130 In June of 2006, CFE
filed a brief with the NewYork Court of Appeals asking for a final order
"that would bring the long-running CFE school-funding case to a close." On
October 10, 2006, attorneys appeared before the Court ofAppeals for oral
arguments on that filing.1
3 '
5. New Jersey
New Jersey, along with Kentucky, was one of the first states to liti-
gate education adequacy. The litigation culminated in two series of cases:
Robinson v. Cahil13 and Abbott v. Burke 33. The New Jersey Supreme Court
found the system of funding public education to be unconstitutional in
Robinson.13 4 The funding system in Robinson fell short of the constitutional
mandate to provide a "thorough and efficient system of free public
126. Id. at 128; Greg Winter, New York Schools Ruling: Overview, N.Y TMEs, Abstract,
June 27, 2003, at Al.
127. 768 N.YS.2d at 129.
128. Id. at 125.
129. "But to get anyone's attention on funding gaps, it had to be as bad as NewYork,
where its high court this week ordered the state to give NewYork City $9.2 billion over
the next five years for school renovation." Derrick Z.Jackson, Separate and Unequal Schools,
THE BosToN GLOBE, Feb. 18, 2005, at Al9.
130. See Rebel, supra note 120, at 307.
131. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Campaign for Fiscal Equality Lawyers Urge Court to
Issue an Enforceable Order Directing Lawmakers to Abide by Previous Rulings to Provide
New York's Children with a Sound Basic Education, http://www.cfequity.org/
pressrelease 10. 10.06.pdf (Oct. 10, 2006).
132. 62 N.J. 473 (NJ. 1973).
133. 153 NJ. 480,490 (N.J. 1998).
134. See Robinson, 62 N.J. at 520.
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schools. 13 In 1975, New Jersey enacted the Public School Education Act,
which the "Court found to be facially constitutional., 136 The Abbott litiga-
tion commenced in 1981 and focused on the constitutionality of funding
and the 1975 Act as applied to several poorer districts ("Abbott dis-
tricts").137 Several iterations of Abbott, court ordered remedial measures,
and legislative response followed.
As a result of finding that the 1975 Act was unconstitutional in the
Abbott districts, the court ordered the legislature to enact new legislation,
which it did with the Quality Education Act of 1990.138 However, the
court did not find the subsequent legislation to be constitutional "because
it failed to ensure parity of educational spending.'' 139 The ensuing legisla-
tion, the Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act of
1996 ("CEIFA"), was also challenged, but the court found it "to be fa-
cially constitutional in its adoption of substantive standards ... that served
to define a thorough and efficient education."14 0 Yet, the court made clear
that educational adequacy involved more than providing for program-
matic changes. The state's constitutional obligation included providing
sufficient financial resources to fund the reforms. Thus, "the Court found
CEIFA to be unconstitutional as applied to the [Abbott districts] because
the statute failed to guarantee sufficient funds to enable students in those
districts to achieve the requisite academic standards . .. ,,"
In 1998, a judge assigned to report on the needs of the Abbott dis-
tricts made the following recommendations: "whole-school reform, full-
day kindergarten for five-year-olds, full-day pre-kindergarten for four-
and three-year olds, summer school, school-based health and social ser-
vices, an accountability system, and added security.', 4 2 In reviewing these
recommendations, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the Com-
missioner of Education was obligated to implement programmatic
measures recommended by the judge as well as "funding measures and
fiscal reforms.'
43
After ordering these remedial measures, the court acknowl-
edged the commitment of both the legislative and executive
branches to education reform.'4 But the court noted that the
response of all three branches of government was insufficient
135. N.J. CONsT. art.VIII, § 4.
136. See Abbott, 153 N.J. at 489, referring to Robinson, 62 NJ. 473.
137. Id. at 490-91.
138. Id. at 491.
139. Id. at 492.
140. Id. at 499.
141. Id. at 511.
142. Id. at 637.
143. Id. at 527.
144. Id.
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until "it is possible to say with confidence that the most disad-
vantaged school children in the State will not be left out or left
behind in the fulfillment of that constitutional promise."'
4
The most recent Abbott case was brought by the Department of
Education ("DOE"), due to concerns about the remedial process as well
as a budget crisis. 1 6 The court order granted relief requested by the DOE,
which largely related to budget requests and a one-year suspension of cer-
147tain remedial measures.
Though each state has its own standard for what constitutes compli-
ance with its educational obligation, the above cases represent a significant
legal trend. Like the concept of education and its role in society that lead
the plaintiffi to file Brown, adequacy litigation emerges from a Counter
Narrative. And like the themes that sprang from the Brown decision's
adoption of the Master Narrative, adequacy as a concept is limited. As
articulated by the courts it provides no clear mandate for equal educa-
tional opportunity for all, nor does it address the issue of education as a
fundamental right. The right articulated by adequacy proponents is equal
funding. The right articulated by the Brown litigants was integration. The
strategies of the former are "redistribution of money"; the strategies of the
latter are "redistribution of schoolchildren."'
148
Moreover, the language of the adequacy decisions is limiting. The
hope is that the ensuing fourth wave of adequacy litigation will move
poor children forward via judicial discourse to define "adequacy" broadly.
"Adequacy" is a concept in the process of legal construction by state
courts across the nation. Legislatures have helped in this construction by
providing standards and measures for accountability. However, adequacy
still needs to overcome hurdles, such as the political question doctrine and
responsibility for implementation. Alternatively, the equality rationale is
clearly a justiciable issue.'4 9 Adequacy may provide more of a compromise
than equality and progress may be incremental and hence, slower. Though
compromise may be better than no solution and incremental progress is
still progress, children do not get a second chance. It appears that the
American education system may be slipping. 0 Time is of the essence.
145. Id.
146. Abbott v. Burke, 798 A.2d 602 (NJ. 2002).
147. Id. at 604.
148. Liu, supra note 67.
149. See Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 443 Mass. 428 (2005);Vincent vVoight, 236
Wis. 2d 588, n.2 (Wis. 2000).
150. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), in 2003, American 15 year olds ranked 24th in math from students among 29
industrial countries. Paul E. Peterson, The Children Left Behind, EDUCATION NEXT, Spring
2005, at 3.
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Unfortunately, in its current iteration, the concept of "adequacy" re-
flects more of a Richmond Choice than a Cumming Choice. Hancock
reinforces the problem by requiring that legislative choices meet only a
rationality standard.' s' In general adequacy litigation provides for only a
basic education for a large number of students. Even as it is increasingly
linked with the NCLB, standards are minimal. In fact, NCLB as it is ap-
plied may limit efforts to expand upon what is an "adequate" education.
The adequacy litigation movement in state courts will need to be
reflective of societal consensus that education is a fundamental right and
that prescribed outcomes need to be achieved. Just like evolving societal
norms were reflected in the Brown and Grutter decisions, so might the
guarantee of an education by the United States Supreme Court one 
day.12
Yet in that context, notwithstanding the wide variations in the definition
of what constitutes adequacy, adequacy must be the baseline. It must not
be the goal.
C. No Child Left Behind
The adequacy litigation and accountability movements in state and
local law and policy continue to work in tandem. As stated earlier, they
spanned the Texas education plan of then Governor George W Bush. That
plan served as the basis for President Bush's federal education policy, the
No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLB"). In addition to standard setting
based on state controlled testing, NCLB establishes the consequences for
schools that fail to meet those standards. In this respect, NCLB takes a
narrow approach to education quality by targeting "failing schools" in-
stead of viewing the problem systemically, including failing to look at the
disparities between schools. In taking this limited approach to improving
education, it furthers the Master Narrative of Brown that the education
problem is limited to children in failing schools, many of which are popu-
lated by minority students.
The NCLB is driven to a large extent by the choice ideology. Yet
the "choice" offered today is much the same as the choice presented to
the Richmond School District, educate a few at an elite level or educate
many at a basic level. The Richmond Choice, the choice endorsed by the
Supreme Court, was to educate many students at the basic level because
that best comported with the economic and political system of the day.
The Cumming plaintiffs were never offered the choice they wanted. The
Cumming Choice likely would have been to educate all Black children to
their capacity. NCLB, today's jurisprudence in education cases, and even
litigation strategies established to address the problem of educational ine-
qualities reflect the Richmond Choice.
151. 443 Mass. at 435.
152. See generally Chenerinsky, supra note 58.
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NCLB was signed into law on January 8, 2002.53 The stated intent
of this act "[t]o close the achievement gap with accountability, flexibility,
and choice, so that no child is left behind"'-$ and the rhetoric surrounding
it is laudable. In sum, it posits that standardized testing, which is developed
and defined by each state, will improve academic outcomes for poor, mi-
nority, disabled, non-English proficient and at-risk children.
One must look beyond the rhetoric to determine the location of
NCLB in the Master Narrative of Brown. Implicit in the way the law is
designed is the rejection of the notion that funding restructuring will cure
the deficiencies. NCLB relies more on a market approach to ending dis-
parities by introducing elements of choice into the education process.
Thus it ignores the broad based harm of segregation and its links to cur-
rent inequities or the broad based methods of ending it.
States are expected to set standards for academic testing and
achievement, and must monitor student progress to ensure that the stan-
dards are being met."'5 Test results must be reported separately according
to student race, ethnicity, disability and English proficiency.16 The goals of
NCLB are achieved through this rigorous testing process and through
school reforms, transfer options for those students in low-achieving
schools, increased participation of parents and improved training and qual-
ity of teachers.'57 NCLB further provides that students who attend schools
identified as needing improvement may transfer to other public schools
within the same school district.
When NCLB was enacted, federal funding was assured for all states
that received Title I funding and complied with the tenets of the NCLB.
To receive this funding, however, states must report "failing" schools along
with a plan for meeting the obligations of the law. Therefore, schools and
school districts are made more accountable and transparent under the
NCLB, since all of this information is made available to the public.""
The most significant aspects of the law were outlined by Secretary
of Education Rod Paige in a press release on November 26, 2002: "9
The NCLB requires that schools achieve "adequate
yearly progress" ("AYP") as part of the accountability
153. The White House, Fact Sheet: No Child Left Behind Act, at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020108.html (Jan. 8, 2002).
154. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2002).
155. U.S. Department of Education, A Guide to Education and No Child Left Behind,
http://www.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/guide/guide.pdf (Oct. 2004).
156. Id. at 18.
157. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 § 1001,20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2002).
158. James S. Liebman & Charles F Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the
Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1703 (2003).
159. U.S. Department of Education, The No Child Left Behind Act Title I: Improving the
Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged Summary of Final Regulations, at http://
www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2002/11/regs-sum.html (Nov. 26, 2002).
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provision. Accountability is assured through standards de-
termined by the state through testing. Schools, local
educational agencies ("LEAs") and state educational
agencies ("SEAs") are held accountable for the successes
(and failures) of students, using these test results.
" As part of the AYP requirement, states must also submit
graduation rates and "one other academic indicator."
" Schools needing improvement must be identified by
LEAs, based upon the SEA assessment, before the school
year begins, in order that steps be taken to immediately
begin improvement. This provision is intended to make
schools accountable and to provide students with op-
tions.
" Schools identified as "failing" that are undergoing re-
structuring must meet the AYP guidelines for "two
consecutive years" or the LEA must continue to provide
students with alternate school and supplemental choices.
Students with disabilities and limited English proficiency
must be provided with appropriate services as described
above.
• Teachers must be "highly qualified," as defined by state
standards, in the subjects they are teaching to their stu-
dents by 2005-2006.
Schools that fail to meet the academic achievement standards set by
the state and outlined in the NCLB are subject to the sanctions listed in
Table 1.
TABLE I
NCLB INTERVENTIONS FOR SCHOOLS
NOT MEETING AYP GOALS
Number of years missing NCLB interventions for schools that receive Title I funds
performance goals based on
tests administered in prior
school year
First year missed None
Second year missed In the first year of school improvement, schools must
offer choice
Third year missed In the second year of school improvement, schools must
offer choice and supplemental educational services
Fourth year missed Schools are in corrective action* and are required to
offer choice and supplemental educational services
Fifth year missed Schools are in the planning stages for restructuring**
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and are required to offer choice and supplemental
services
Sixth year missed Schools are now in the implementation stages of
restructuring and must continue to offer both choice and
supplemental services.
* Corrective action: is a significant intervention designed to remedy persistent inability of the
school to make adequate progress toward all students becoming proficient in reading and
mathematics
** Restructuring is a major reorganization that involves fundamental reforms such as changes
in school staffing and governance.
Adapted from GAO-05-7 No Child Left Behind Act
Thus failing schools are not closed immediately. Yet they operate in a
category that might result in better students leaving them for higher per-
forming schools. Moreover, as the following discussion indicates, funding
for raising the performance rates of failing schools may be substantial.
D. Costs Associated with the NCLB
The changes outlined by NCLB will be costly to SEAs and LEAs.
In 2003, the House Education Chairman defended federal funding for the
NCLB as being adequate. 160 By 2004, the House Democratic Caucus
Chairman cited inadequate funding of the law as "deceitful" on the part
of the federal government.1 61 The National Conference of State Legisla-
tures (NCSL) has named the NCLB the most costly (to states) of all
unfunded federal mandates.
16 2
According to the Department of Education, the federal government
has allocated $410 million to states for purposes of developing and im-
plementing testing programs. 16 However, in a report issued in May 2003,
the GAO estimated that the costs of developing and implementing stan-
dardized tests from 2002-2008 could be as high as $5.3 billion if testing
includes a significant written component, or $3.9 billion if the questions
remain as they were when reported to the GAO.
16 4
160. U.S. Newswire, House Education Chairman Challenges AFT Attack on Bush Educa-
tion Budget, at http://releases.usnewswire.com/getrelease.asp?id=12521 (Feb. 5, 2003).
161. Democratic Caucus U.S. House of Representatives, Menendez: Bush Fails
Children by Underfunding No Child Left Behind Act, at http://www.dems.
gov/ index.asp?Type=B._PR&SEC={B314ED6A-7FD8-4401-BOAO-879E1546ED7D}&DE
={OA 19B504-CFC7-4570-927F-62E51ED4802F} (Jan. 8 2004).
162. 1 MANDATE MONITOR 1, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/
mandatemonitor.pdf (Mar. 31,2004).
163. U.S. Department of Education, A Guide to Education and No Child Left Behind,
http://www.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/guide/guide.pdf (Oct. 2004).
164. U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-03-389, available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03389.pdf (May 2003).
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The most costly aspect of the standardized testing is the cost to
states of scoring, administering and then reporting the tests. If states im-
plement only multiple-choice tests, it is unlikely that extra costs will be
incurred above those appropriated for the NCLB. If, on the other hand,
states choose to offer both multiple choice and open-ended questions,
then the costs to states will far exceed what the federal government is
likely to pay. Costs vary significantly by state. The following table provides
estimates of the costs to the five states being considered in this report.165
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES FOR TITLE I ASSESSMENTS, 2002-2008
State Cost in Millions of Implementation Federal Government
per Type of Testing Payments as Percent of
Costs
Multiple Current Mixed* Federal Multiple Current Mixed
Choice Type Dollars Choice Type
Assigned
Kentucky 28 62 71 43 155 70 61
Massachusetts 38 109 109 55 144 50 50
Mississippi 25 63 63 39 154 61 61
New Jersey 43 127 127 67 153 53 53
New York 83 276 276 121 146 44 44
* Mixed refers to both multiple choice and open-ended questions
Adapted from GAO -03-389 Title I
If the states listed here opt for multiple choice testing alone, then
federal funding will be adequate, at least in the near future. However, if
states choose more comprehensive testing strategies, the money bench-
marked for these programs will fall short.
Testing represents only one aspect of the costs associated with the
mandates outlined in NCLB. The costs of providing students in failing
schools with technical assistance in the form of tutoring or transportation
to non-failing schools are significant. These costs will vary by SEA and
LEA, according to the number of "failing" schools.
A GAO report of Title I schools, conducted in 2004, found that 1 in
10 schools had been "identified for school choice:' meaning that students
had the right to transfer to other schools.166 Approximately 31,000 students,
about 1% of those eligible, did choose to transfer.1 67 For districts already
overcrowded and with limited time to arrange for student choices, these
transfers were a hardship. Title I schools that were required to provide
165. Id. at 19.
166. U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-05-7, available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d057.pdf at 8 (Dec. 2004).
167. Id. at 8, 14.
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choice to students ranged from 0-4% in some states to as high as 47% in
other states. 168 Clearly the costs associated with this requirement will de-
pend upon the LEA and may change over time.
The GAO report of 2004 describes the percentage of Title I schools
in each state that were required to offer choice. 69 These numbers changed
significantly between the 2002/03 school year and the 2003/04 school
year. Those states faring the worst in 2003/04 are Georgia and Hawaii
at 47.8% and 40.2%, respectively. Nevertheless, this is down from the
2002/03 school year, in which 56.39% and 58.99% of those schools, re-
spectively, were identified for choice.1 7 2 Some states have seen significant
declines in the percentage of choice schools, such as Indiana and Dela-
ware, whereas other states have seen tremendous increases in the number
of choice schools, such as Arkansas and Nevada.17 3 Table 3 presents the
changes in percent of Title I schools identified for choice of the states
being studied in this report.
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF TITLE I SCHOOLS IDENTIFIED
FOR CHOICE BY STATE
State Percentage of Schools Percentage of schools
Identified for Choice Identified for Choice
2002/03 2003/04
Kentucky 2.89 2.86
Massachusetts 17.27 17.88
Mississippi 1.35 1.05
New Jersey 18.78 19.00
New York 14.65 17.56
Adapted from GAO-05-7, Appendices I/ and III
As described by Secretary Paige, up to 20% of Title I Part A funds
from the federal government can be used to pay for costs of transporta-
tion and supplemental services for students attending schools identified as
"failing." Although Federal funding for Title I programs in FY04 is $12.3
billion, 17 the National Conference of State Legislatures ("NCSL") reports
that the NCLB will be underfunded by approximately $10 billion in
FY05. The cost of implementing the NCLB represents the largest fiscal
168. Id. at 13.
169. Id. at 12.
170. Id. at 43-46.
171. Id. at 45.
172. Id. at 43.
173. Id. at 43, 45.
174. U.S. Department of Education, Education Department History of Appropriations, at
http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/edhistory.pdf (Feb. 6, 2006).
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gap of all federal programs, higher even than the cost to states of provid-
ing drugs for "dual eligibles" (patients who are eligible for both Medicare
and Medicaid benefits) and the costs associated with the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act.'
For states like Georgia and Hawaii in which nearly half of all Title I
schools are required to offer choice, the costs for transportation to alter-
nate schools and for supplemental education may be prohibitive. In the
Fresno Unified School District in California, for instance, more than
34,000 students were eligible for choice but only 0.3% of those students
actually transferred. 7 6 The logistics of sending a child to a school that is
not failing in a state where a large percentage of schools are required to
offer choice is also a great concern. The GAO report cautions that the
problems of transferring students are unlikely to abate in the near future
and may in fact be exacerbated by the increasing number of schools iden-
tified as failing. The cost of offering transfers and the limited capacity of
schools to accept transferring students will need to be addressed the near
future.
E. Standardized Testing and No Child Left Behind
The discussion so far has centered on the costs associated with
NCLB. Some authors and organizations caution that there are significant
problems associated with the NCLB aside from costs. For example,
NCLB assumes that standardized testing is the best way to measure
achievement and that improving scores through sanctions will improve
educational outcomes, particularly for minority, poor and disabled stu-
dents. The GAO report and others do not support these claims. 7
Standardized testing that treats all students alike may actually exacer-
bate the problems of equity in the public school system, according to some
researchers. 17 It is suggested that high-stakes testing actually discriminates
against some students because of differences in background and "learning
styles" and that such tests provide only scores, without suggesting how to
175. 1 MANDAT MONITOR 1, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/
mandatemonitor.pdf (Mar. 31, 2004).
176. U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-05-7, available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d057.pdf at 40 (Dec. 2004).
177. See, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-06-815 available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06815.pdf (July 2006) (recommending that the Education
Department "explore ways to provide additional flexibility for measuring annual progress
for" students with "limited English proficiency" and U.S. General Accounting Office,
GAO-05-618, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05618.pdf at 28 (July 2005)
(recommending that the Education Department provide better information on "alternate
assessment requirements for students with disabilities ... linked to information on the
research, development, and use of these assessments").
178. Donald C. Orlich, No Child Left Behind:An Illogical Accountability Model, 78 THE
CLEARING HouSE 6 (2004).
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improve those scores.17 9 Furthermore, "high-stakes" testing may not neces-
sarily be the best gauge of how well or how poorly students, teachers and
schools are performing. Some caution that "near-total reliance on test
scores" can be "misleading and damaging."180
The capacity of test scores to provide an overall measure of student
ability seems to be limited by the tests themselves.'8 1 It is unclear from the
research whether or not standardized testing is a fair or appropriate meas-
ure of student ability and teacher competence.1 8 2 Also, in a high
accountability environment where outcomes are measured using high-
stakes tests, overall test scores may improve without improving critical
thinking skills. 83 The GAO therefore recommends that more research
needs to be done in this area to determine the validity and reliability of
such testing, and whether tests are measuring what educators, administra-
tors and legislators believe the tests are measuring.1
4
Nevertheless, testing is a means of interpreting what students have
learned and is an integral part of education. It is part of the "feedback
loop" that allows teachers to discern what students know and do not
know1 8s For now, standardized testing is the tool with which the Federal
Government is measuring whether or not students, teachers and schools
are meeting NCLB requirements.
179. Paul W DeVillier, High-stakes testing: Florida comprehensive assessment test. A true
measure of acquired skills or a political ruse?, available at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/
data/ericdocs2/contentstorage_01 /0000000b/80/22/e8/51.pdf (June 14, 2003).
180. Lisa Guisbond & Monty Neil, Failing our children: No Child Left Behind under-
mines quality and equity in education. The Clearing House, 78 THE CLEARING HOUSE 12, 13
(2004).
181. Paper Presented by Michael Kane, at the Annual meeting of the Am. Educ.
Research Ass'n, The Role of Policy Assumptions in Validating High-stakes Testing Programs, avail-
able at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/content-storage_01/00000006/80/
26/22/a4.pdf (April 2001).
182. Donald C. Orlich, No Child Left Behind:An Illogical Accountability Model, 78 THE
CLX.ING HOUSE 6,6-11 (2004).
183. Paper Presented by Brian A. Jacob, at a conference at the John F Kennedy Sch.
Of Gov., Harv. Univ., Test-based Accountability and Student Achievement Gains: Theory and
Evidence, available at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/contentstorage01/
00000006/80/28/1a/d9.pdf (June 10-11,2001).
184. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Major management challenges at the De-
partment of Education, at http://www.gao.gov/pas/2005/doe.htm (last visited November 7,
2006).
185. Samuel E. Krug, Maybe We Learned All We Really Needed to Know in Kindergarten:
But How Could Anybody Be Sure Until We Took the Test? in MEASURING up: AssEssMENT Is-
SUES FOR TEAcHERS, CoUNsELoRs AND ADMINISTRATORS 485, 485-95 (Janet E.Wall & Garry
R.Wale eds., 2003).
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F. Adequacy and No Child Lefi Behind
The language in state constitutions regarding education is typically
vague, requiring that courts make the final decision about what consti-
tutes an "adequate education" This type of litigation has met with limited
success as LEAs and SEAs attempt to fund the mandates set forth in the
NCLB.
1 86
A case in point is Reading School District v. Department of Education ar-
gued in June 2004.187 The Secretary of Education identified 13 of the
district's 20 schools as failing to meet AYP as defined by NCLB. The
Reading School District argued that 1) the department did not provide
native language testing, 2) that technical assistance to the district was in-
adequate and 3) that the minimum number assigned for subgroups
requiring assistance was arbitrarily defined. 8
The NCLB does not require that schools provide tests in a student's
native language except to the "extent practicable:' Because there are 125
languages used in the Pennsylvania school system, the Department argued
that providing native language testing was not feasible at the time. Fur-
thermore, such tests take time to develop and test in the field and would
not be available until 2005. The court held that "it is not practicable at
this time to provide native language testing."
189
The PSSA requires that 35% of all students enrolled in schools re-
ceiving Title I funds demonstrate proficiency in mathematics, and 45% of
students be proficient in reading by the end of the 2004 school year. If
that level is not met, then the school has not achieved AYP, according to
the NCLB guidelines set by the state of Pennsylvania.
These goals must be achieved by all subgroups of students as men-
tioned above (non-English proficient students, students in minority
groups, those students who live in poverty, and students living with dis-
abilities) if there are more than a certain number of students in each of
these groups. Pennsylvania has set this number at 40, which means that
when the number of students in each of these subgroups is 40 or above,
then these subgroups of students should be evaluated separately. However,
these students are also required to achieve AYP.
The number of students that constitute a subgroup, known as the
"N" number, has to be defined by each state based upon "sound statistical
methodology." The school district argued that this number was arbitrarily
chosen in Pennsylvania and was not based on any statistical formula. The
186. See Jennifer Brown, Court Tosses Claim That School Funding Low, Unconstitutional,
THE DENVER POST, Mar. 10, 2006, at B-03; see also Jeffrey Robb Bob Glissman, Suit by
Rural Schools Dismissed Thirty-Four Districts Contended that the State Did Not Provide Adequate
Funding for Them to Offer a Quality Education, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 7, 2005, at 0 1B.
187. Reading Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 855 A.2d 166 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
188. Id. at 168-69.
189. Id. at 172.
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court disagreed and held that the "N" number was determined appropri-
ately and not arbitrarily.
The district claimed that the funding from the Department was in-
adequate to meet requirements of the NCLB, particularly given that the
district is "extremely impoverished." The court again disagreed, ruling in
favor of the Department of Education. The district, although one of the
poorest in the state, had already received $6 million in Title I funds and
had begun to make some of the necessary changes as required under the
NCLB for schools identified as needing improvement. The court held
that the Department had no obligation to provide technical assistance
until after schools had been identified as needing improvement.
The court was correct that funding for technical assistance is not re-
quired prior to identification of a school as needing improvement.
Nevertheless, the GAO recommends that the Department of Education
provide states with more technical assistance and that proven strategies be
shared among states to decrease costs of implementation.' 9° Within states,
the ability to provide more technical assistance will depend upon federal
funding for the NCLB, which is lacking. 9'
The Pennsylvania constitution states that "[t]he General Assembly
shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient
system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth."' 92
Providing "maintenance and support" after a school has been identified as
needing improvement is both short-sighted and damaging to poor and
minority students.
G. Integration and No Child Left Behind
Criticism of the NCLB policy around issues of funding and costs
abounds, as does criticism of the validity and reliability of some state's
testing requirements and procedures. Troubling anecdotal evidence indi-
cates that improvement in Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment
System ("MCAS") passing scores reflects the reality that more Black and
Latino students are lost from the testing pool. In fact, there is some evi-
dence that a whole category of "All But MCAS" students are leaving the
public school systems in Massachusetts.
Additional troubling aspects of the relationship between race, in-
come and NCLB are emerging. In 2002, the GAO found that of all
public schools receiving Title I funding, those identified as needing to
provide choice to students had higher percentages of minority and low-
190. U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-05-7, available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d057.pdf at 35-36 (Dec. 2004).
191.. 1 MANDATE MONITOR 1, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/
mandatemonitor.pdf (Mar. 31, 2004).
192. PA. CONST. art. III, § 14.
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income students. Specifically, among the schools required to offer choice,
80% of the students were from minority groups and 62% of students were
from low-income families, compared to 46% minorities and 49% low-
income students in schools not required to offer choice.
1 93
The GAO also found that, in one school district, among students
who were eligible to transfer from one of the schools but did not, 76%
were minority and 93% were from low-income families. On the other
hand, of students who actually transferred, only 47% were minorities and
87% were low-income. Thus, minority students were not transferring at
the level of their eligibility and a higher proportion of those minorities
who were transferring were not in the low-income category Across the
five schools in that district studied by the GAO, the number of eligible
and transferring students did not vary as significantly: 68% of eligible stu-
dents were minority and 62% of those who actually transferred were
minority; 85% of eligible students were low-income and 82% of those
who transferred were low-income.1
94
Clearly, a large proportion of students currently attending "failing"
schools are poor and minorities. This seems to suggest that education for
these students, as defined by the Federal Government, is already "inade-
quate" and requires remediation. Providing transportation and technical
assistance to students once a school has been identified as needing im-
provement is both costly and time consuming. Moreover, if a whole
district is impoverished and many of its schools are required to provide
choice, then to which school should students be transferred? The GAO
reports that the number of failing schools is increasing and will continue
to increase over time.1 9
Nevertheless, some educators assert that the integration of poor and
minority students into more economically advantaged schools can im-
prove academic achievement,1 96 and the NCLB could be a vehicle
through which desegregation occurs.19 7 However, forced choice may actu-
ally exacerbate existing disparities. 98 Parents who are involved and
informed may choose to transfer their children out of failing schools,
while parents with limited English proficiency may not have the informa-
tion necessary to make informed choices about which school is most
193. U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-05-7, available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.item/d057.pdf at 11 (Dec. 2004).
194. Id. at 18.
195. Id. at 34.
196. See McUsic, supra note 59, at 1355-56, cited in Some Districts Find Economic Inte-
gration Boosts Achievement, 35 YouR SCHOOL AnD THE LAW 2 (2005).
197. James S. Liebman and Charles F Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and
the Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. RE. 1703 (2003).
198. William Taylor, Title I as an Instrument for Achieving Desegregation and Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1751 (2003).
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appropriate. Children left behind in failing schools may be exactly the
children who would benefit most from transfer.
In addition, NCLB provides that students who attend schools iden-
tified as needing improvement may transfer to other public schools within
the same school district. This provision, known as the school choice pro-
vision, is in conflict with the desegregation orders that remain in place in
many Southern and some Northern school districts because students
transferring out of their current schools may upset the racial balance
mandated by court desegregation orders. Despite the stated intent of leg-
islators that NCLB supports both court ordered and voluntary
desegregation, recently drawn regulations under the school choice provi-
sions undermine that intent. 99 The United States Department of
Education has responded to the concerns of the school districts by in-
structing them to follow the school choice provision of NCLB at the
expense of desegregation plans. These regulations are relatively new law,
and much is to be learned about how they are implemented and what the
results will be. Nevertheless, despite many concerns, newly appointed Sec-
retary of Education Margaret Spelling says that many of the topics of
NCLB which have been the subject of criticism are "off the table" for
discussion, let alone reform.
H. Restructuring: The Consequences of Failure
There are critical consequences for schools failing to meet NCLB
standards that go beyond allowing students to transfer to other schools.
Some strategies focus on supplementing services of failing schools. They
include providing expert consultations, training teaching staff and even
extending the length of the school day. Other interventions focus on
school management. If schools continue to under-perform after one year
of corrective action, schools are subject to restructuring, including re-
opening the school as a charter school or privatizing the school's
operation. These strategies deal with the consequences more than the
causes of failure. And according to S. Paul Reville, the strategies "have lit-
tle or no research evidence to support their effectiveness."200
I. Retrieving Quality from Adequacy: Toward Diversity
and Cultural Competence
Legal theorists continue to attempt to advance the Counter Narra-
tive idea that segregation was harmful not only to Black children but to
society as a whole. Justice Blackman's opinion in Bakke supported that
199. Nick Lewin, The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001: The Triumph of School Choice
over Racial Desegregation, 12 GEo. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 95, 118 (2005).
200. S. Paul Reville, Bring Teachers to the Table, BOSTON GLoBE,Jan. 3, 2006, at A-13.
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effort and provided theoretical support for diversity/affirmative action
movement. 20 ' The effort toward diversity responds to the first element of
the Master Narrative, which views segregation's harm as limited to Blacks.
It posits that all education is benefited from a multi-racial student body
and that all education is harmed by racially exclusive practices. Diversity
thus becomes the goal and affirmative action the methodology for achiev-
ing it. In fact the diversity/affirmative action movement asserts that racial
homogeneity harms the education process in general or, put positively,
that all students benefit from diversity in the classroom.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote for the Court in the case of
Grutter v. Bollinger,20 2 which involved an affirmative action plan used at the
University of Michigan Law School. While approving the plan, her care-
fully crafted opinion defines the parameters of permissible affirmative
action and provides a framework for understanding the social conditions
that lead to the Court's decision, particularly through her recognition of
historic educational disadvantages that minority students have experi-
enced and the value of a diverse body to the educational experiences of
all students. °3 The contextualization O'Connor provides is significant in
its potential for reconciling differences over the legally and socially divi-
sive issue of race-conscious decision making. O'Connor cites legal
precedent as well as historical and current racial disparities in reaching the
conclusion that diversity is a compelling interest and one that justifies
consideration of race.
In passages that demonstrate an appreciation of the dilemma raised
by the affirmative action, Justice O'Connor cites "our Nation's struggle
with racial inequality" as contributing to racial disparities in educational
outcomes, making affirmative action necessary.0 4 But the opinion makes
clear that we are not to be controlled by this history forever: "We expect
that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary.' 2 This language was the immediate subject of legal commen-
tary and various interpretations. A somewhat benign interpretation is that
25 years is a benchmark for measuring affirmative action's effectiveness.
This interpretation sounds no alarm to affirmative action supporters and
suggests to its critics that they must accept the idea, but only for the time
being. Others view the reference as a "sunset" provision, the end of which
will mark the end of affirmative action. Supporters of affirmative action
favor the language's most generous interpretation as providing a protective
time frame during which the Court would withhold from review of af-
firmative action plans. At the very least, separate from any legal
201. 438 U.S. 265, 402-08 (1978).
202. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
203. Id. at 338.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 343.
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interpretation of the 25-year projection, O'Connor's words are a chal-
lenge to a new generation to take additional measures, beyond affirmative
action, to bring about an end to racial disparities in education.
In affirming diversity as a compelling state interest, Justice
O'Connor rejected a basic assumption of the Master Narrative as ex-
pressed in Brown. She concluded that the benefit of integration accrued to
the entire learning process and not simply the students of color. If inte-
gration helps everyone, then the notion, promoted by Brown, that
segregation harmed only Blacks must be rejected. Moreover, O'Connor
linked the need for affirmative action measures to the disparity question,
positing that in 25 years we may not need such measures, but that dispari-
ties in educational achievements justified them currently. She
contextualizes the issue of racial disparities, using historical and current
references, and in part rejects the notion that color-blindness will secure
the end of disadvantages. Given O'Connor's acknowledgment of the nu-
merous Amici Curiae briefs in support of diversity, her opinion read
broadly asserts that desegregation benefits education as well as larger soci-
ety.
Grutter's reasoning was recently expanded and applied to public
school education in the case of Comfort v. Lynn School Committee.20 6 At is-
sue in the case was a voluntary school integration plan that took race into
consideration only when granting transfer requests. Lynn School officials
argued that integration produced positive outcomes including "higher
attendance rates, declining suspension rates, a safer environment, and im-
proved standardized test scores. 20 7 The American Psychological
Association supported the Lynn School plan in a brief that argued the
educational benefits of a diverse student population. The brief "educated
the court concerning some of the processes involved in prejudice and
discriminatory behavior, including negative stereotypes, in-group bias,
aversive racism, intergroup anxiety, and implicit stereotypes" as well as
"the importance of intergroup contract for the development of children's
social and moral reasoning."20°8 In upholding the school district's consid-
eration of race, the United States Court of Appeals recognized that was in
the public primary school system's interest.
The diversity concept is significant to the discussion of the achieve-
ment gap issue. The Comfort case establishes a positive link between
diversity and improved educational and social outcomes. The decision also
contributes significantly to the contextualization that needs to take place
in legal reasoning in order to address the dual problem of educational
206. 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
207. Id. at 14.
208. Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Defendants-Appellees, Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F3d 1 (1st Cir. June 14, 2004)
(No. 03-2415), available at http://www.apa.org/psyclaw/comfort-v-lynn.htnil (June
2004).
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outcome and positive racial legal policy. Further expansion of the concept
and research on diversity and improvement in education is needed to
move the current discussion further. Nevertheless, the importance of
Comfort in expanding the racial narrative of the court in educational mat-
ters should not be underestimated. This case and the research supporting
the Lynn School plan serve as models for sound judicial reasoning. They
also expand understanding of the complex problems involved in improv-
ing education for both children of color and White children.
Though courts at the federal level have moved from equality in
Brown (1954) to diversity in Grutter (2003), the two are analogous. In-
209creasingly, the courts are diminishing their role in desegregation, yet
there is evidence that a number of school districts are moving towards the
concept of voluntary integration to promote diversity.210 Diversity, like
adequacy, is a still-evolving social and legal construct. Also like adequacy,
diversity when properly defined minimizes income, class, and racial strati-
fications. Both concepts focus on universal policy outcomes, avoiding
polarization of political interests. The success of both diversity and educa-
tion adequacy policy is the result of a holistic approach to policy benefits.
An adequate education is intended to permit all children to acquire capa-
bilities that enable them to be productive citizens. The financial
implications of these policies are less visible and open ended in the policy
design.
The limitations of the diversity concept as articulated in the Grutter
and Lynn decisions are practical as well as philosophical. As a concept that
promotes equality of education for all, it deviates toward better options
for parents. However, as a practical matter, these options are limited be-
cause such programs are voluntary and isolated. Moreover, neither the
plan adopted by the University of Michigan Law School nor the plan
used by Lynn School District address the broader issues of inequalities,
and it is unclear whether attempts to do so would pass the Grutter re-
quirement of being "narrowly tailored"21t
Recent efforts at ending racial and class disparities have directed at-
212
tention to cultural competence. Simply defined, cultural competence is
209. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
111,112 (2004).
210. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Looking to the Future:
Voluntary K-12 School Integration, available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/
resources/manual/manual.pdf at 31 (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
211. Fair, supra note 76, at 1859 (arguing that Grutter leaves in place "white educa-
tional hegemony," which ignores white privilege and a history of racial exclusion in
education). Professor Fair is correct in his criticism if one views diversity as a remedial
effort. Diversity as described by Grutter and its proponents is better seen as an enhancing
measure. That is, diversity and cultural competence were viewed by the Michigan Law
School as measures that enhanced the education of all students.
212. Focus on cultural competence has been particularly significant in health care,
social work and educational arenas. See, e.g., C. Daniel Mullins et al., Health disparities: A
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"the ability of teachers to understand their students' culture and incorpo-
rate it" into the lessons and learning in a class.213 Culture impacts our view
of the world and implicates "the deep structures of knowing, understand-
ing, acting, and being" in it. In the area of education, the movement has
spawned initiatives that range from multicultural education in teacher
preparation programs1 s to providing culturally sensitive supports and in-. 216
terventons. For individuals who share a racial identity, cultural
knowledge and understanding may be transmitted over many generations
and may transcend issues of class.217 Moreover, research shows that the
impact of culture on learning and cognition is profound no matter what
the subject matter, effecting achievement in subjects from math to mu-• 218
sic. Yet some experts are skeptical about the significance of cultural
competence in academic programs and the role it plays in changing edu-
cational outcomes. They argue that culture is not a determining factor ineductionl "219
educational achievement. However, as existing programs and policies are
developed around notions that evolve from dominant culture, cultural
awareness must play a part in our evaluation those efforts and develop-
ment of news ones.
Cultural competence, like diversity, enriches the educational experi-
ence of all students. It is "the ability of teachers to understand their
students' culture and incorporate it" into the lessons and learning in a
class.220 Cultural competence involves many areas of skill development
including relationship building, communications and problem defini-
tion.21 The latter area of skills development is particularly relevant to the
Barrier to High-Quality Care, 62 AM J. HEALTH-SYsT PHARI. 1873, 1877-78 (2005);Yooson
Park, Culture as Deficit: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Concept of Culture in Contemporary
Social Work Discourse, 32 J. OF Soc. AND SOc.WELFARE 11 (2005); see also Tara J.Yosso, Whose
Culture Has Capital? A Critical Race Theory Discussion of Community Cultural Wealth, 8 RACE,
ETHNICITY ANDI EDUC. 69 (2005).
213. The Associated Press, Education Groups Push for Greater Diversity in Teaching Force,
21 BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC. 14 (2004).
214. Gloria Ladson-Billings, It Doesn't Add Up:African American Students' Mathematics
Achievements, 28 J. FOR REs. IN MATHEMATICS EDUC. 697,700 (1997).
215. Wendy W Brandon, Toward a White Teacher's Guide to Playing Fair: Exploring the
Cultural Politics of Multicultural Teaching, 16 INT'L J. OF QUALITATIVE STUDIES IN EDUC. 31
(2003).
216. Frances S. Caple, Ramon M. Salcido, John di Cecco, Engaging Effectively with
Culturally Diverse Families and Children, 17 SOCIAL WORK IN Eouc. 156, 159 (1995).
217. Id.
218. M. COLE,J. GAY, J.A. GLICK, & D.W SHARP, THE CULTURAL CONTEXT Or LEARN-
ING AND THINKING: AN EXPLORATION IN EXPERIMENTAL ANTHROPOLOGY (N.Y.: Basic Books,
1971).
219. Jacquetta Hill-Burnett, Commentary: Paradoxes and Dilemmas, Anthropology &
Education Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 4, ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MULTI-CULTURAL
EDUC. 37, 37-38 (Nov. 1976).
220. The Associated Press, supra note 213.
221. Caple, supra note 216.
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incorporation of Counter Narratives into solutions that aim to end edu-
cational disparities. The narrative a minority community develops about
the educational process as well as about the solutions to the process can
determine its responses to solutions offered. Utilizing a culturally sensitive
approach to defining education problems and solutions may result in
greater success. For example, striking a balance between traditional culture
and American culture may be difficult for many immigrant families. Many
educators view lack of parental involvement as part of the reason for stu-
dent failure. Yet, in some immigrant communities teacher expectations
about parental involvement in schools may be greater than parental ex-
pectations. For immigrants, lack of involvement may not be perceived as
part of the problem at all 2 An arrangement which enlists cultural under-
standing in negotiating the when, where and how of parental
participation is likely to be more fruitful.
A broad range of initiatives needs to be undertaken to incorporate
the Counter Narrative into efforts at improving educational outcomes.
Identifying the problem is only one element of the teaching and services
changes that need to take place and problem identification represents only
one way cultural competence can be helpful. A broader development of
the concept of cultural competence than is currently available is needed
to develop a real understanding of the relationship between the various
policy and programmatic initiatives discussed in this paper and the narra-
tives that have developed around education. In sum, as currently
understood and applied, cultural competence is an important element in
ending disparities, but it is not enough.
III.THE LESSON FROM THE NARRATIVE: TODAY'S HIGH
PERFORMING SCHOOLS
Despite their limitations, educationally enriching policies like cultural
competence and diversity are important. In part they are valuable because
they lead us away from simplistic solutions to the complex problem of edu-
cating an economically, racially and ethnically diverse population. The
approach taken by the Court in Cumming in assuming that the school
board's choice was one of educating more Black students rather than a
choice between educating White over Black students illustrates one of the
most naive ways of viewing the issue. The Court's response to the issues
presented by Cumming belies the complexity of the facts and context from
which the case arose. The Board's decision to close the Ware High School
came in 1897, 17 years after it had opened. Four factors combined to
make the Ware High School possible, "the black masses' strong desire for
222. Diana L. Rogers-Adkinson, Theresa A. Ochoa, & Bernadette Delgado, Develop-
ing Cross-Cultural Competence, 18 Focus ON AUTISM & OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES 4, 4-8 (2003).
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education, black political power, the activities of the black elite, and the
attitudes of white leaders." 223 From the day it opened, the "black commu-
nity" exercised considerable political and social resources in controlling
the Ware High School's teacher recruitment, mission and curriculum.
22
Ware, the only public high school for Blacks in Georgia before 1915, of-
fered a classical curriculum with the idea that it would provide "well-
trained" teachers for Black elementary schools in Richmond and the sur-
rounding counties. At that time, a high school education was the
equivalent of today's college education, and few of the citizens of Georgia
of any race attained this level of education. In post-war Georgia, literacy
was not a public priority and Ware was one of five Black schools estab-
lished in the confederate South. There is evidence that the Black elite in
Augusta also saw Ware as a mechanism for maintaining the Black middle-
221class, beyond providing school teachers. White officials also supported
the school's mission of educating local teachers and used the school as an
example of their magnanimity in appealing to Black Augustans for
226votes. As Ware students did well, so did the Augusta community. Com-
mencement exercises and names of graduates were featured in local
newspapers along with those of graduation announcements from White
high schools. Augusta Whites took ownership of the Ware High School
and the responsibility to educate Black students rather than relying on
private schools operated by religious organizations that were open to
Blacks seeking a high school education. The Richmond County School
Commissioner, Lawton B. Evans supported the idea of educating "some
Negroes of exceptional capacity" to serve as "teachers and leaders of their
,,227race.
White leaders were motivated by something personal as well. Ware
was supported by a close-knit circle of Black families who were closely
connected to these White leaders. Historian J. Morgan Kousser noted that
Augusta Black elite's "fair skin made them generally indistinguishable
from the white population, and they were also related to prominent white
families by blood" 228 A late nineteenth century drawing of Augusta shows
the location of the Ware School. 229 One block over is Cumming Street,
named after one of the White ancestors of the plaintiff in the lawsuit or
one of his relatives. 2 30 For a variety of reasons, Augusta Blacks and Whites
223. Kousser, supra note 30, at 28.
224. Id. at 22-23.
225. Nearly 70 percent of the Black signers of a petition to keep Ware open were
identified by occupation as professional, business owners or skilled laborer. In comparison,
only 32% of the people of both races signing the petition fit those categories. Id. at 27.
226. Id. at 23.
227. Id. at 23.
228. Connally, supra note 33, at 76.
229. Id. at 74.
230. Kousser, supra note 30, at 28.
[VOL. 12:107
A History of Hollow Promises
had reached an agreement that allowed not only for the education of
Blacks beyond the rudimentary level typical in the post Civil War South.
That agreement also included political engagement and economic ad-
vancement of a number of Blacks in the Augusta community.231 In 1887
the Black middle-class and elite of Augusta would use their social and
political capital to protest the Board's closing ofWare and the breaching of
the social compact. 232 In 1898, when the school closed, 60 students were
prepared to enroll in the school.233 A month after the Supreme Court's
decision upholding the Ware High School closing, Blacks were eliminated
from municipal offices in an all-White primary.234
A. Today's Richmond Choice
As it was with Brown, Rodriguez, Milliken and every other education
case, Cumming was a case about community. More specifically, these are all
cases about breakdowns in the flawed community agreements. The law-
suits simply reflect an attempt to reconstruct these flawed agreements
when political and social strategies failed.
The situation in the Ladera Heights neighborhood in Inglewood,
California is also about community. The move by Black middle class par-
ents to secede from the Inglewood School District to the adjacent Culver
School District reflects the reality that many parents see public schools as
a place to educate their children as well as a "marker of community
membership or citizenship., 235 Parents who seek secession to a higher per-
forming school are simply trying to assert community membership. One
parent who is against the effort describes the transfer racist and "as an at-
tack on the African American male."236 A Black columnist for the Los
Angeles Times describes the secession effort as "self loathing" and "self
interested.
237
While the thinking of those who want to move has a disturbing ra-
cial dimension, it is predictable in the context of education, where
achievement can be so easily predicted by the race and class of a schools'
community. Meaningful choices are limited and the choice to redefine
one's community is understandable. That choice is not limited to Ladera
Heights parents who seek to redefine community by redrawing bounda-
ries. Their choices are political and social as well as racial. Parents in
231. Id. at 23. See also Connally, supra note 33, at 76.
232. Kousser, supra note 30, at 27.
233. Cumming, 175 US. at 533.
234. Kousser, supra note 30, at 43.
235. Lawrence III, supra note 9, at 1377.
236. Randal C. Archibold, Wanting Better Schools, Parents Seek Secession, N.Y TMES,Jan.
28,2006.
237. Erin Aubry Kaplan, Race Education and the Wrong Answers, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25,
2006.
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Ladera Heights are deciding which governing body will control their
children's educational destiny. They are also deciding with whom their
children will associate on a daily basis. Finally, they could be deciding
their children's earning potential.238 It is the same choice that is evident in
the facts leading to Milliken v. Bradley, where White parents in Detroit
moved from the city to the suburbs and school district lines defined
community in ways that excluded the predominantly Black inner-city
Detroit. 239 The Supreme Court supported that choice by upholding the
sanctity of the school district boundaries of suburban school districts.
The choice to redefine one's community is evident in the parental
resort to school vouchers to move their children to private schools despite
the fact that there is little evidence that private schools provide better
achievement outcomes for Black or Brown students. The community
choice is also apparent in the provisions of NCLB, which allow the trans-
fer out of failing schools and to schools often located outside the
neighborhood in which students reside.The alternative offered to middle-
class Ladera Heights parents is to stay in the Inglewood School District
and work to change it, with limited resources, or to leave the system for a
private school. The Inglewood District is thus in jeopardy of losing its
social, economic and political capital to the detriment of all members of
the community.
In practical terms, the choice presented is also about educational
opportunity. There is mounting evidence that the choices presented do
not enhance education for everyone, but reflect a paradigm that elects to
educate those remaining in the public school system to a minimum level.
By dividing communities by race or class, as the Richmond School Board
did in 1899, today's choices encourage school abandonment and lower
the standards for those who remain in the system. Reports of the NEAP
test results indicate that while the accountability efforts are raising student
scores on state exams, they are doing little to raise the federal test scores of
fourth and eighth graders. The gap between national and state scores may
suggest that the states have "embraced low standards and grade infla-
tion. Moreover, the report suggests that racial and economic
achievement gaps continue to persist. 41 Choices today mimic the choice
of the Richmond Board.42
238. See Michael Olneck, The Brown Conferences: Economic Consequences of the Academic
Achievement Gap for African Americans, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 95 (2005).
239. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 723.
240. See Diane Ravitch, Every State Left Behind, N.YTiMES, November 7,2005, at A3.
241. See Jason Spencer, Report card mixed for Texas students; Students beat national peers in
3 of 4 areas, but achievement gaps fail to improve, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 20, 2005, at
B1. See also Ross Wiener, Guess Who's Still Left Behind, THE WASH. POST,Jan. 2,2006, at A13
(asserting that the low scores of Black and Brown students shut "these students out from
meaningful civic engagement and economic opportunity").
242. See Connally, supra note 33, at 84.
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What is evident from examination of the facts behind the Cumming
case is the critical role the Ware School played in the community's de-
mocratic, economic and social participation in the larger Augusta
community and the relationship between that role and individual student
performance. Today, despite the array of options both public and private
in school offerings, local schools still play that community role.
243Educational stratification precedes social stratification. Some of the
best predictors of educational achievement are economic and social back-
ground. Race, class and community location are all relevant factors in
analyzing the issue of academic disparities. High poverty schools are likely
to be characterized by "overcrowded classes, weak curricula, insufficiently
trained teachers, high teacher turnover, low standardized test scores, high
grade retention and school drop-out rates, and low rates of parental in-
volvement."2 4 However, to assume that poverty consigns students to lower
academic achievement equates to a declaration of "poverty as destiny,"
which results in abandoning efforts to help all students learn regardless of
their socio-economic circumstance.24 Because of the relationship be-
tween race and income, poverty as destiny also amounts to a declaration
of race as destiny. Such declarations are tantamount to a denial of equal
educational opportunity for poor children and are inconsistent with the
moral mandate of the equal protection clause. Constitutional analysis like
successful education strategies must take into account a variety of factors
including: "communities, leadership, curriculum and teaching, resources,
students, demographics, mobility."246 Thus, what is required to improve
schools, even on the individual performance level, is jurisprudence along
with policies, practices and litigation strategies that understand this inter-
action.
The role the law and the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment must play can not be ignored because community, in many cases, is
defined by race and or class.247 The Supreme Court has never held that the
right to education is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.
Yet, the Court in Plyer v. Doe acknowledged that education is more than
"some governmental 'benefit" ,248 but without articulating what that ele-
243. Dekkers, Bosker and Driessen, 6 Complex Inequalities of Educational Opportunities,
Educational Research and Evaluation, 59, 59-82 (2000).
244. Orfield, Gary and Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessys
Nightmare, ThE HA AIRD Crvi. RIGHTS PROJECT (2004) available at http://
www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
245. Reville, S. Paul, Testimony before the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, February 6,2003.
246. See Reville, supra note 200.
247. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 111, 132 (2004) (arguing that the courts must play a greater role in ensuring educa-
tional equality because the political process will not work to that end).
248. 457 U.S. 202,221 (1982).
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vated status requires in terms of Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny. As pub-
lic schools become more and more segregated, the need for constitutional
analysis that recognizes the importance of the role of education becomes
even more important. Nevertheless, the trend is for federal courts to
withdraw from the role as instrument of desegregation. 249 Similarly, on the
level of policy and public discourse, we have moved to a view of educa-
tional issues as involving liberty and private choices rather than equality
and public responsibility.20 It is also evident that the paradigm driven by a
focus on the limited concept of racism's impact has not served the law
well in ending educational disadvantages."'
Policies that follow the narrative of race and racism, such as those
that promote the idea of "choice" in a segregated system where choices
are already limited, will ultimately fail to enhance the educational
achievement of those in the system. To the extent that policies and strate-
gies like Title I and adequacy litigation are drawn into the web of the
NCLB "choice" philosophy, they too will fail. Moreover, we will never
begin to institutionalize the kinds of school reform and pedagogical
measures that have proven successful. Systemic measures that acknowledge
the impact of poor health, bad housing and crime on achievement can
serve learning as well as the overall community environment in which
learning takes place for many low income, minority students. s2 Pedagogi-
cal approaches that draw on the knowledge and skills of minority teachers
can serve to reengage low income parents and parents of color in their
253children's education, thereby promoting achievement and community.
School partnerships such as those that pair schools with local businesses or
colleges can help improve the achievement level of poor students of color
and engage those students with sponsoring institutions. All of these are
based on enhancement and equality models, not on a choice model.
CONCLUSION
Narratives do more than tell stories. They describe behavior from
which we can ascertain a society's values. Narratives do more than tell us
where we are. They express a vision for where society can go. Thus, the
249. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund Inc., The Civil Rights Project at Harvard,
and The Center for Law and Policy at the University ofVirginia School of Law, Looking
to the Future: Voluntary K- 12 School Integration at 6-7, available at http://
www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/resources/manual/manual.pdf (last visited Nov. 7,
2006).
250. See Lawrence III, supra note 9, at 1357-1359.
251. Professor Lawrence asserts that unacknowledged racism has so distorted the
democratic process that we must engage in "affirmative disestablishment of subordination"
in order to overcome it. Id. at 1383-1386.
252. See Rothstein, supra note 8.
253. SeeYosso, supra note 212, at 75.
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Master and Counter Narratives that followed Brown are instructive of the
law as it exists as well as the law's normative potential. As Robert Cover
advised, every narrative is insistent in its demand for a prescriptive point
that is located in history.5 4 No educational policy or law is complete
without some conformation to the historical and contemporary narratives
of the communities most impacted. Policies addressing educational ine-
qualities must address the related class and race issues as well as language
realities of the communities where today's "failing" schools are most often
located. Policies and litigation must develop strategies that include paren-
tal inputs and community aspirations for the children most affected. The
economic, political and spiritual future of our communities is tied to our
children's abilities to utilize the talents they possess. The laws and policies
we seek as solutions to contemporary problems must be informed by a
collective experience and vision that incorporates the realities of all
communities.
254. Cover, supra note 16, at 5.
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